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A Common-Law Remedy for the Eviction 
Epidemic 
Brian M. Miller* 
ABSTRACT 
Eviction burdens tenants and their households with incredible hardship. 
But it long has been the standard legal remedy when a tenant fails to keep up 
with rent payments. The combination of these two facts has birthed a crisis. Many 
commentators have responded to the crisis by suggesting legislative or executive 
solutions, but courts and the common law have been mostly ignored. This article 
focuses on courts and the role they can play under the common law to minimize 
unnecessarily harmful evictions. By considering reasonable expectations and 
interests of not only landlords, but of tenants and the public as well, this article 
proposes that courts should opt for a monetary remedy in certain cases in which 
eviction may otherwise be the norm. 
In many cases, eviction lacks theoretical justification. Although some 
landlords are intimately affected by the day-to-day use of their rental units, 
others are not. In fact, some landlords hold so many rental units that their 
interest in the units is more like that of a distributor’s interest in commercial 
goods. They seek to generate income from the units, but rarely, if ever, use the 
properties themselves. When a rent arrears dispute involves such a landlord on 
one side, and a tenant likely facing homelessness on the other, eviction may be 
unjustified and a monetary remedy perhaps should replace it. If courts were to 
consider this approach, they could find support from common-law remedial 
principles in both contract and property. 
 
*J.D., University of Virginia School of Law; B.A., North Carolina State University. I 
thank Rich Schragger, Julia Mahoney, Michael Doran, and W. Augustus Todd for 
helpful comments. 
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The eviction crisis in this country is well-documented. Hundreds of 
thousands of people are evicted every year, and low-income individuals, 
racial minorities, and women are disproportionately affected.1  An eviction 
may result from a number of things, such as criminal activity by a tenant 
or tenant’s guest, a failure by a tenant to pay rent, or a simple desire by a 
landlord to move on to another tenant.2  Usually a landlord’s decision to 
evict a tenant is entirely lawful.  Standard contracts for rental housing 
expressly allow a landlord to evict a tenant under certain circumstances,3 
and state statutes authorize landlords to file “summary ejectment” actions 
to quickly remove tenants who violate lease provisions.4  The thesis of this 
article is that courts should nonetheless consider a monetary remedy 
instead of eviction in special cases: when eviction would likely result in 
homelessness, the landlord owns an abundance of rental units, and the 
landlord cannot show it will make productive use of the unit in the 
immediate future. 
Legal as eviction may often be, it presents a significant hardship to 
many tenants—especially tenants who are evicted because of rent arrears.5 
When a person or family is forced to move before the end of the original 
lease term, they must find alternative housing quickly. That is easier said 
than done. Vacant rental properties may abound, but they may not be 
practically available to low-income families searching for housing in a 
 
1 MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY 
98 (2016). 
2 David A. Dana, An Invisible Crisis in Plain Sight: The Emergence of the 
“Eviction Economy,” Its Causes, and the Possibilities for Reform in Legal Regulation 
and Education, 115 MICH. L. REV. 935, 946 (2017) (describing the need for reforms 
to combat eviction crisis and identifying rent arrears as a common reason for eviction). 
3 See, e.g., Interstate Realty Mgmt. Co. v. Price, 86 So. 3d 798, 801 (La. Ct. App. 
2012) (describing a lease provision that allowed for the landlord to evict the tenant 
under certain circumstances); Bentley-Kessinger, Inc. v. Jones, 367 S.E.2d 317, 318 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (dealing with a post-eviction dispute brought about by the terms 
of the lease agreement); Dominski v. Frank Williams and Son, LLC, 46 A.D. 3d 1443 
(N.Y. S. Ct. 2007) (dealing with a post-eviction dispute brought about by the terms of 
the lease agreement); Keller Williams Realty v. Melekos, No. 2015CA0679, 2015 WL 
6951406 (La. Ct. App. 2015) (dealing with a post-eviction dispute brought about by 
the terms of the lease agreement). 
4 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-26; N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 711; 735 
IL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-101. 
5 Dana, supra note 2, at 937. 
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pinch. For one, a family who has just been evicted for rent arrears likely 
does not have much cash on hand for a deposit and first month’s rent. 
Moreover, past evictions typically show up on a permanent record, and 
many landlords refuse to rent to people with past evictions because of the 
risk of subsequent default.6 
Public housing is rarely helpful. If government-funded rental housing 
ever was abundant and easily accessible, it is no longer.7 Federal funds 
have been siphoned off from public housing projects, preventing the 
construction of new projects to keep up with demand and suppressing the 
maintenance of existing facilities that are dissolving into disrepair.8 And, 
public housing projects that do still operate are often fully occupied with 
long waiting lists,9 which may be reserved for people without a history of 
evictions.10 The picture is similar for nonprofit-run housing and shelters, 
which are often packed full and limited to people with “clean” records.11 
An eviction is therefore often more serious than simply forcing a 
tenant to move. Such a court decision may practically be a judgment 
mandating homelessness. And the harsh consequence of abrupt 
homelessness radiates through all facets of life.12  Homeless children may 
miss school, causing them to fall behind and perhaps never graduate.13  A 
father or mother who continues to work may be unable to secure a safe 
 
6 Id. (“[T]enants know that a formal eviction on an individual’s record makes 
finding decent new housing much, much more difficult. They understand that an 
eviction record is like a criminal conviction record--a stain that marks an individual 
as undesirable for a range of purposes.”). 
7 Cara Hendrickson, Racial Desegregation and Income Deconcentration in 
Public Housing, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 35, 39 (describing the neglect and 
diminishment of public housing over recent decades). 
8 Id. at 38–40. 
9 Hanrahan v. Housing and Redevelopment Auth. of Duluth, Minn., 912 F. Supp. 
428, 435 (D. Minn. 1995) (describing a plaintiff who complained of being placed at 
the bottom of a public housing waiting list). 
10 See Gerald S. Dickinson, Towards a New Eviction Jurisprudence, 23 GEO. J. 
ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 20 (2015) (describing the harsh consequences of the “one 
strike rule” in federally-funded housing). 
11 See Juan Pablo Garnham, Texans With Criminal Records Face Increasingly 
Limited Housing Options. Homeless Advocates Say a New Rule Could Leave Them 
With Even Fewer Choices., THE TEXAS TRIBUNE, Oct. 16, 2020 (explaining that 
housing in entities receiving housing tax credits may be limited to people without 
criminal records). 
12 Dana, supra note 2, at 937 (explaining that eviction “undermines poor 
people’s efforts to gain and maintain employment, and to provide their children 
something like a stable education and a sense of agency”). 
13 Id. at 937 (explaining that eviction “undermines poor people’s efforts to gain 
and maintain employment, and to provide their children something like a stable 
education and a sense of agency”). 
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place for children during working hours,14 exposing the children to various 
dangers like criminal activity or disease.15  Indeed, a person who has been 
evicted may be unable to keep a job at all because she lacks the means to 
get to work or lacks the time to work because she is in search of new 
housing.16  On top of it all, psychological research reveals that eviction is 
a traumatic experience.17 “Involuntary housing loss,” as it has been 
called,18 is linked to persistent depressive symptoms.19 Such symptoms 
can hamper a person’s diligence to pursue change in a variety of areas of 
life – relational, economic, or otherwise.20 
All in all, the picture is bleak. Tenants who struggle to stay afloat are 
cast out into a situation that further inhibits their ability to secure income 
and stability.21 It’s a vicious cycle. For these reasons and others, the 
foremost sociologist in the field, Matthew Desmond, explains that 
“[e]viction isn’t just a condition of poverty; it’s a cause of poverty.”22 
Commentators have proposed various reforms to combat the eviction 
crisis. These range from substantive policy solutions like mandating the 
construction of additional affordable housing or statutory protections 
against eviction from public housing for the bad acts of guests outside of 
 
14 Id. at 940–41 (describing a tenant, who, because of eviction, ultimately had to 
send her minor children to live with other people just to make sure they had some 
stability). 
15 Effects of Poverty, Hunger, and Homelessness on Children and Youth, AM. 
PSYCH. ASS’N, https://www.apa.org/pi/families/poverty [https://perma.cc/9UZ6-
P6YR] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020) (describing how children experiencing 
homelessness are more likely to also experience illness, mental health issues, and 
witness violence). 
16 Eloisa C. Rodriguez-Dod, “But My Lease Isn’t Up Yet!”: Finding Fault With 
“No-Fault” Evictions, 35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 839, 866, n.201 (2013) 
(describing the difficulty of finding a job for people struggling to pay rent). 
17 Id. at 868, n.212. 
18 Harold J. Krent et al., Eviction Court and a Judicial Duty of Inquiry, 24 J. 
AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 547, 554 (2016). 
19 Id. 
20 Sarah Swan, Home Rules, 64 DUKE L.J. 823, 878–79 (2015). 
21 Anne Kat Alexander, Residential Eviction and Public Housing: Covid-19 and 
Beyond, 18 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 243, 252–54 (2021). 
22 Terry Gross, First-Ever Evictions Database Shows: “We’re in the Middle of 
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the tenant’s control,23 to procedural protections like the right to counsel 
for tenants in summary ejectment proceedings.24  Substantial attention has 
been given to reforming or counteracting the “one strike rule” in Section 
8 and public housing,25 which allows entities receiving federal funds to 
evict tenants after only one incident of drug related activity on the 
premises.26  Most of these proposed reforms would likely be helpful and 
are worth thorough consideration, but little attention has been given to 
substantive reform in the common law surrounding evictions. Perhaps that 
should come as no surprise. Valid rental contracts provide for eviction and 
state statutes allow it when leases are violated.27  What is left for a court 
to do except affirm the property rights identified in the contract and 
blessed by the legislature? 
In fact, courts could act to “reform” the law and combat the eviction 
crisis. In the past, courts, under their common-law discretion, have taken 
an active role in developing landlord-tenant law to conform to 
contemporary knowledge and needs.28  The most visible example has been 
the oft-noted trend to evaluate residential landlord-tenant issues through a 
mix of property and contract law principles.29  Famously, this revolution 
has birthed the implied warranty of habitability, which allows tenants to 
withhold rent if the landlord fails to maintain the residential premises in a 
 
23 See, e.g., Kristen David Adams, Do We Need a Right to Housing?, 9 NEV. L.J. 
275, 300 (2009) (discussing how recognizing a right to housing might spur the 
construction of additional affordable housing units); Robert Van Someren Greve, 
Protecting Tenants Without Preemption: How State and Local Governments Can 
Lessen the Impact of HUD’s One Strike Rule, 25 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 135, 
136–37 (2017) (arguing for various state and local legislative action to counteract the 
harmful effects of HUD’s one-strike rule). 
24 Quite a bit of attention has been given to this particular potential reform. See 
generally Andrew Scherer, Gideon’s Shelter: The Need to Recognize a Right to 
Counsel for Indigent Defendants in Eviction Proceedings, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
557 (1988); Ericka Petersen, Building a House for Gideon: The Right to Counsel in 
Evictions, 16 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 63 (2020); Raymond H. Brescia, 
Sheltering Counsel: Towards a Right to a Lawyer in Eviction Proceedings, 25 TOURO 
L. REV. 187 (2009). 
25 See generally Caroline Castle, You Call That a Strike? A Post-Rucker 
Examination of Eviction from Public Housing Due to Drug-Related Criminal Activity 
of a Third Party, Note, 37 GA. L. REV. 1435 (2003); Paul Stinson, Restoring Justice: 
How Congress Can Amend the One-Strike Laws in Federally-Subsidized Public 
Housing to Ensure Due Process, Avoid Inequity, and Combat Crime, 11 GEO. J. ON 
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 435 (2004). 
26 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6). 
27 See supra notes 3 and 4. 
28 Edward Chase & E.H. Taylor, Jr., Landlord and Tenant: A Study in Property 
and Contract, 30 VILL. L. REV. 571, 572–73 (1985). 
29 Id. 
6
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 3 [], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss3/6
2021] THE EVICTION EPIDEMIC 801 
 
sufficiently livable condition.30 Courts recognized the unique challenges 
posed by housing insecurity in urban centers and responded in accord with 
renters’ reasonable expectations – a hallmark approach of contract law.31 
Because the agrarian characteristics of rural Britain – which originally 
justified a property-focused approach to leases – had given way to new 
realities, a common-law “development” was justified.32 
This article argues that the common-law “revolution” in landlord-
tenant law is at least one hurdle short of completion, and that hurdle is the 
issue of rent arrears. The revolution has enhanced the substantive rights of 
tenants based on modern realities of rental housing, but it has not 
substantially swept through the remedies side of the analysis.33 In other 
words, tenants today are better positioned to show that their landlord 
materially breached a lease agreement. But what is the right course of 
action when a tenant breaches?  
The standard remedy is indeed eviction.34  Landlords reasonably want 
to avoid housing someone on their property who cannot consistently pay 
rent, especially when a whole crowd of other potential renters who may be 
able to pay wait in line. Landlords thus include express provisions in lease 
contracts allowing them to evict a tenant who falls behind on rent 
payments.35 And state legislatures have accommodated landlords by 
 
30 Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant Law, 
23 B.C. L. REV. 503, 521–23 (1982); Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 
(D.C. Cir. 1970). 
31 Javins, 428 F.2d at 1078. 
32 Id. (explaining that “today’s city dweller usually has a single, specialized skill 
unrelated to maintenance work; he is unable to make repairs like the ‘jack-of-all-
trades’ farmer who was the common law’s model of the lessee”). 
33 The contract revolution has addressed remedies to an extent, though, to the 
extent that doctrines like the implied warranty of habitability affect both the 
substantive obligations and the potential remedies for parties to a lease agreement. 
34 Glendon, supra note 30, at 512 (describing how eviction or ejectment has long 
existed as a primary right of landlords). 
35 See, e.g., Interstate Realty Mgmt. Co. v. Price, 86 So. 3d 798, 801 (La. Ct. 
App. 2012) (describing a lease provision that allowed for the landlord to evict the 
tenant under certain circumstances); Bentley-Kessinger, Inc. v. Jones, 367 S.E.2d 317, 
318 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (dealing with a post-eviction dispute brought about by the 
terms of the lease agreement); Dominski v. Frank Williams and Son, LLC, 46 A.D. 
3d 1443 (N.Y. S. Ct. 2007) (dealing with a post-eviction dispute brought about by the 
terms of the lease agreement); Keller Williams Realty v. Melekos, No. 2015CA0679, 
2015 WL 6951406 (La. Ct. App. 2015) (dealing with a post-eviction dispute brought 
about by the terms of the lease agreement). 
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passing statutes expressly allowing civil actions in court to quickly remove 
such breaching tenants under the force of law.36 
But it is time for the judicial branch to engage. Just as courts took an 
active role in coaxing landlord-tenant law to reflect changed circumstances 
and serve the interest of minimally acceptable housing for all paying 
tenants, so too they should embrace their common-law role of recognizing 
changed circumstances and serve the interest of housing stability for more 
low-income people. What would this look like? Primarily, in some special 
cases, it would look like choosing a remedy other than eviction, like 
damages, even when the lease terms allow for eviction. Some landlords 
own dozens or more rental units geographically distant from their own 
home, and they rent out most of these properties to strangers.37  Although 
these properties are undoubtedly “real” property,38 their value and 
relationship to the landlord is in some ways more like that of a collection 
of goods leased out for temporary use.  It is thus worth considering how 
strong of a right to exclude should rest unwaveringly with the landlord.  
The landlord’s primary interest is an expectation, however reasonable or 
unreasonable, of a continuous stream of rental income. That interest 
matters, but it should not be the only relevant consideration. A struggling 
family’s interest in stable housing, the likelihood that the landlord could 
actually find a paying substitute tenant quickly, and the strain on 
government resources presented by combatting homelessness after the fact 
all matter too.39 
Of course, in any given case these various considerations may shake 
out differently than in other cases. That case-by-case nuance is precisely 
why courts should have a greater role in exercising their remedial 
discretion.40  As in other contract or property cases, courts often must 
exercise discretion to determine the most appropriate remedy, even when 
 
36 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-26; N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 711; 735 
IL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-101. See also Glendon, supra note 30, at 512. 
37 Rental Housing Stock, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. OF HARV. UNIV., 
https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/ahr2011-4-stock.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2YLS-HM66] (last visited Nov. 4, 2020). See also Michael 
Kolomatsky, Mom and Pop Own Fewer Rental Units, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/31/realestate/institutional-investors-landlord.html 
[https://perma.cc/F3PX-2Z9C]. 
38 For a discussion of the classic definitions of real and personal property, see 
George P. Costigan, Jr., A Plea for a Modern Definition and Classification of Real 
Property, 12 YALE L.J. 425, 426 (1903). 
39 Alexander, supra note 21, at 252–54. 
40 Unlike legislatures, which typically pass general laws targeted to broad 
categories of occurrences, courts are able to consider the intricacies and oddities of 
special cases as they arise. 
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parties to a lawsuit ask for something different.41 That sensible approach 
has not generally entered the picture in landlord-tenant disputes over 
unpaid rent, but it should. Importantly, this new change would find some 
support from old principles in both contract and property law.42 
Part II of this article explores why, based on the history of landlord-
tenant law, eviction came to be the standard remedy for nonpayment of 
rent. It then reviews two modern trends in law and public policy putting 
pressure on that traditional approach: the contract revolution in landlord-
tenant law and the modern right to housing movement. Part III channels 
the questions those trends present and lays out the core theory of this 
article: in some eviction cases, namely when the landlord does not live on 
the rental premises and the rental unit is one of many the landlord owns, 
courts should “balance the equities” and consider alternatives to eviction 
for a tenant who has come on hard times and fallen behind on rent 
payments. Part IV explains why courts that pursue such a course would 
not necessarily be engaging in unconstrained judicial activism but instead 
would adhere to longstanding principles of the common law of contracts.  
Part IV also explains why this remedies-based solution to the eviction 
crisis need not only fall under the banner of the contract law revolution, 
but that it could additionally be supported by some of the well-established 
principles of property law. 
II. THE HISTORICAL CONVERSATION 
This Part explores why eviction is the standard remedy when a tenant 
fails to keep up with rent payments. One primary reason is that residential 
leases, though they are generally precipitated by a contract, center on 
property rights – especially the rights of the landlord in whatever property 
is the subject of the lease.43 That being so, the law has provided a property-
like remedy to landlords – one that restores to the landlord all the 
traditional rights in the “bundle of sticks,”44 including the right to exclude.  
This Part also identifies some trends that challenge the traditional 
conception of leases. These include the contract revolution in landlord-
 
41 Marco Jimenez, Remedial Consilience, 62 EMORY L.J. 1309, 1310–11 (2013) 
(explaining that judges have a duty in essentially every case to wrestle with the issue 
of which remedy is most appropriate). 
42 Id. 
43 John A. Humbach, The Common-Law Conception of Leasing: Mitigation, 
Habitability, and Dependence of Covenants, 60 WASH. U. L. Q. 1213, 1214–15 (1983) 
(explaining the centrality of property rights and property law to residential leases). 
44 Glen Anderson, Towards an Essentialist Legal Definition of Property, 68 
DEPAUL L. REV. 481, 493–96 (2019) (describing the traditional conception of property 
rights as a bundle of sticks, and the nature of some of those sticks). 
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tenant law and the modern right to housing movement.45 The remedy of 
eviction has thus far withstood any significant scrutiny. But this article is 
common-law-focused; so it is concerned not only with where we have 
been, but also where we should go.46 
A. Why Eviction? 
The common law in the United States places a high value on property 
ownership.47 When someone owns property, whether “personal” or “real,” 
the law entitles them to a set of rights over that property.48 That set, 
traditionally called the “bundle of sticks,” includes the rights to possess 
the property, use the property, alienate the property through gift or sale, 
and exclude others from the property.49 These rights are not quite 
absolute,50 but they are very strong.51  So strong that the government 
formally constrains itself from infringing on them.52 The federal 
constitution and state constitutions prohibit the government from 
depriving a person of property rights without sufficient legal process,53 and 
in some cases the government even must pay the property owner for the 
owner’s lost value due to government action.54 A famous article thus 
coined the label “property rule” for legal entitlements that cannot be taken 
 
45 See, e.g., Glendon, supra note 30; Adams, supra note 23. 
46 Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897) (famously, 
and perhaps controversially, arguing that although the common law inherently 
references the past for counsel, the point of it, and the role of lawyers and judges, is 
to take part in guiding law to the right ends, and predict what those ends will be). 
47 See generally Anderson, supra note 44. 
48 Holmes, supra note 46, at 461. 
49 Denise R. Johnson, Reflections on the Bundle of Rights, 32 VT. L. REV. 247, 
247 (2007). 
50 For example, the common law provides a “necessity” exception to the right to 
exclude when an exception is necessary to preserve human safety or life. And statutory 
and constitutional law may limit an owner’s right to exclude others from their property 
in a discriminatory way. Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188, 189 (Vt. 1908). 
51 Although Blackstone’s conception of property rights is now thought to be 
somewhat outdated, it represents the traditional notion that property rights only 
implicated a unilateral relationship between a person and a thing, and could not be 
infringed upon by others under most any circumstance. See Johnson, supra note 49, at 
250. 
52 Id. 
53 U.S. CONST., amends. V, XIV; N.Y. CONST., art. I, § 6; TEX. CONST., art. I, § 
19; COLO. CONST., art. II, § 25. 
54 U.S. CONST., amend. V (“nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation”). 
10
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without the owner’s consent and for an owner-specified price.55 In short, 
the ethos when “property” is in play is that the owner owns it, full stop.56 
The owner cannot be forced to do anything with it she does not want to 
do.57 
The landlord party to a lease owns the land.58 Thus, under the 
traditional conception of property rights, the landlord can hold, use, sell, 
and exclude others from their land as they wish and on their own terms.59 
A lease represents a landlord’s voluntary decision to limit some of her 
rights to the land for a period of time.60 But “voluntary” is the key. The 
temporary limitation of rights over that land only extends as wide and as 
long as the landlord agrees.61 If the terms of a lease say that the tenant’s 
rights end after one year of tenancy, then traditionally the fullness of the 
landlord’s rights returns after that one year.62 And if the lease agreement 
says that the tenant’s rights end if the tenant fails to pay rent at the 
beginning of every month of the lease term, then, again, all of the 
landlord’s rights may return in full force if the tenant misses a payment.63 
Importantly, the right to exclude returns to the landlord at the end of 
the lease term or upon a tenant’s breach.64 Typically, that means that 
anyone who enters or remains on the landlord’s property without her 
permission may be liable for trespass and could be removed or sued for 
damages even if they do not harm the property.65 That is where eviction 
 
55 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972) (“An 
entitlement is protected by a property rule to the extent that someone who wishes to 
remove the entitlement from its holder must buy it from him in a voluntary transaction 
in which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the seller.”). 
56 Id. 
57 See Johnson, supra note 49, at 248. 
58 For a classic definition of a “lease,” see Franklin v. Jackson, 847 S.W.2d 306, 
308 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 800 (5th ed. 1979) 
(“[T]he word ‘lease’ ‘means a contract by which one owning such property grants to 
another the right to possess, use and enjoy it for a specified period of time in exchange 
for periodic payment of a stipulated price, referred to as rent.’”). 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 55, at 1106. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. Again, this reality is predicated not only on the fact that property rights 
allow landowners to dictate the terms of conveyances, but also because statutes tend 
to give force to lease provision calling for eviction. Id. 
64 Id. 
65 For a classic definition of common-law trespass, see Medeika v. Watts, 957 
A.2d 980, 982 (2008) (describing trespass as an intentional entry onto property 
possessed by another). 
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finds its theoretical justification. When, based on the landlord’s desire 
reflected in the lease terms, a tenant’s rights end, the tenant may be 
removed from the property.66 
The common law traditionally viewed a real property lease as a 
conveyance of real property, not a pure contract.67 In other words, a lease 
agreement gave the specifications under which the landlord turned over 
property rights to another.68 As long as those specifications were met, the 
landlord was thought to have transferred several property rights to the 
tenant.69  But, again, all rights to the property reverted back to the landlord 
if specified conditions, like nonpayment of rent, occurred.70 The traditional 
picture gave much power and benefit to the landlord71—power to dictate 
all the terms of the transfer of property, and the benefit of having no duties 
to the tenant beyond those voluntarily assumed.72 Indeed, so strong and 
embedded were (and are) landlord property rights that states passed 
statutes authorizing landlords to bring actions to remove tenants from their 
property on a showing that the tenant did not comply perfectly with all the 
lease terms.73 
B. Pressure on Pure Property Rights 
The common law is a creature of change, though, and landlord-tenant 
law is certainly no exception.74 In fact, it is in some ways a poster child of 
 
66 Glendon, supra note 30, at 506. 
67 Chase & Taylor, supra note 28, at 572–73. 
68 Glendon, supra note 30, at 506 (describing the conveyance perspective of real 
property leases). 
69 See id. See also Franklin v. Jackson, 847 S.W.2d 306, 308 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1992) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 800 (5th ed. 1979) (“[T]he word ‘lease’ 
‘means a contract by which one owning such property grants to another the right to 
possess, use and enjoy it for a specified period of time in exchange for periodic 
payment of a stipulated price, referred to as rent.’”). 
70 Glendon, supra note 30, at 533. 
71 Christopher Wm. Sullivan, Forgotten Lessons from the Common Law, The 
Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, and the Holdover Tenant, 84 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 1287, 1293–94 (2006). 
72  Id. (“Having executed a lease, a landlord merely gave up possessory rights to 
the premises for the duration of the lease. At this point, the tenant received the 
bargained-for benefit and became responsible for the property, and, consequently, 
although the parties could create express obligations, few implied duties were imposed 
on the landlord. The landlord had few inherent duties regarding services, repair, or 
upkeep.”). 
73 See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-26; N.Y. CONSOL. LAW § 711; 735 Il. Comp. Stat. 
5/6-101, et seq. 
74 Sullivan, supra note 71, at 1290. 
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common-law evolution.75 The contract revolution reconfigured the lens 
through which leases were viewed, and thus shifted some rights and 
entitlements from landlords to tenants.76 And, although that revolution has 
now slowed – if not halted completely –77 people  still have big dreams for 
a tenant-favoring system of rental housing.78 The modern right to housing 
movement has many different iterations, and some call for extreme change 
that largely ignores property rights of homeowners who want to rent.79 
Although I do not necessarily endorse either the past or coming revolution 
fully, the presumptions behind these movements are worth evaluating 
before I propose what could be viewed as a compromise approach. 
1. The Contract Revolution 
The contract revolution in landlord-tenant law has been ongoing for 
likely more than a century,80 and it puts pressure on property rights as 
traditionally expressed. The revolution marks a shift from looking at 
landlord-tenant legal issues through the lens of pure property law to 
analyzing them through the lens of contract law.81 This shift has expanded 
tenants’ entitlements beyond those expressly granted by the landlord who 
holds the property right.82 I evaluate this revolution in the landlord-tenant 
context to note how the common law has not treated property rights as 
absolute in the traditional sense when competing interests, like those of 
tenants who need adequate housing, come into play. 
Again, a lease for real property was traditionally thought of as a 
conveyance of that property.83 That means the landlord who owned the 
property unilaterally conveyed the property, or at least some rights to the 
 
75 Id. (“Moreover, these developments [in landlord-tenant law] were considered 
radical because they effectively displaced centuries of common law in the course of a 
few decades—the wink of an eye in property law. As one commentator described it, 
‘The residential tenant, long the stepchild of the law, has now become its ward and 
darling.’”). 
76 Id. (“starting with a flood of reform in the late 1960s and early 1970s, tenants’ 
legal protections substantially increased”). 
77 By this I simply mean that no major new developments have surfaced in the 
substantive law of landlords and tenants since the implied warranty of habitability 
took root. Id 
78 See infra Part II.B.2. 
79 See infra Part II.B.2. 
80 See Glendon, supra note 30, at 503–04. Some commentators assert that 
landlord-tenant law has always operated substantially under contract principles and 
thus the revolution is not so revolutionary. Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Sullivan, supra note 71, at 1290. 
83 Humbach, supra note 43, at 1214.   
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property, to a tenant for a period of time.84  Just like with the conveyance 
of a freehold estate, the landlord was the master of the transfer:85  She 
could dictate all the terms of the transfer and possession of those rights.86 
Importantly, to treat the lease as a conveyance meant that the landlord had 
no duties regarding the property once it was conveyed (unless the landlord 
expressly chose to assume certain duties).87 The landlord transferred the 
property on her own terms, could get the property back in accordance with 
the terms she dictated in the conveyance, and did not have to do anything 
else for the tenant.88 If the property deteriorated or was damaged while in 
the tenant’s possession, the burden fell on the tenant to do something about 
it, even if the property was rendered unusable.89 
That approach developed early in the history of leases, when land to 
be used for agriculture was usually the subject of the conveyance.90 Feudal 
lords in England were granted title to the land, ultimately from the 
Crown.91 The lords leased the land to tenants – serfs – who were allowed 
to farm the land for their own subsistence if they paid the lord (usually in 
produce).92 The tenants were often allowed to live on the land, but they did 
not always do so.93 The one-sided duties created by a lease in some ways 
fit the times. Tenants who used the land for agriculture were usually skilled 
 
84 Id. (“The traditional rules governing the landlord-tenant relation generally 
have been thought to rest on the idea that leases are essentially conveyance 
transactions, that is, when a lease is made, an ‘estate’ in land is conveyed by the 
landlord to the tenant.”). 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Chase & Taylor, supra note 28, at 578 (“The contract doctrine of 
independency of covenants denies that constructive conditions can be created to 
relieve a party who fails to incorporate a condition in the contract; it insists that such 
conditions be express.”). 
88 Sullivan, supra note 71, at 1292–94. 
89 Chase & Taylor, supra note 28, at 577–78. 
90 Sullivan, supra note 71, at 1291. 
91 CORNELIUS J. MOYNIHAN & SHELDON F. KURTZ, Introduction to the Law of 
Real Property §7, at 9 (3d ed. 2002) (describing the pyramidal system of land 
ownership in England, under which all land ownership originated from the monarch 
and was distributed vertically downward several levels). 
92 D Donald Weinstein, Landlords and Peasants, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/history-of-Europe/Landlords-and-peasants 
[https://perma.cc/G36U-KC78] (last visited Nov. 6, 2020) (describing how serfs 
would often pay “rent” by contributing a portion of the harvest to the feudal lord). 
93 See id. (describing how tenants often were bound to land on which they were 
born, but were sometimes free to live and work elsewhere if they could arrange for it). 
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in manual labor and craft.94  When defects developed on the land, such as 
a collapsing shed, the tenants were well-equipped to fix them.95 
After the industrial revolution in the United States, population began 
concentrating in cities.96 More people had to live on less land, and poorer 
people often worked in factories, not on farms.97 Because of the land 
scarcity and evolved economy, tenants sought leases just to have a place 
to live, not a place from which to subsist directly.98 And landlords dealt in 
units of buildings, not in land.99 Thus, the new “serfs” merely needed 
adequate housing; they did not seek to develop or profit off of the land like 
in the past.100 Likewise, the new “lords” did not seek to have their land 
maintained, but sought money instead.101 
Eventually, courts recognized that it made sense to view a residential 
lease as an agreement rather than as a conveyance alone.102 After all, the 
rights conveyed to the tenant were limited and did not include the ability 
to exercise much dominion over any land.103 Because the lease was an 
agreement, principles regarding the law of agreements, or contracts, 
applied.104 The law of contracts is largely governed by the objective 
expectations of the parties to an agreement.105 And because a tenant’s 
purpose for entering the agreement was obviously to have adequate, safe 
 
94 Sullivan, supra note 71, at 1295. 
95 Id. 
96 Bashar H. Malkawi, Labor and Management Relationships in the Twenty-
First Century: The Employee/Supervisor Dichotomy, 12 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 1, 21 
(2008). 
97 Id. at 20. 
98 Id. (“Prior to the creation of large concerns employing hundreds of 
individuals, the working class in the Western world earned their daily bread by making 
and selling small crafts or by farming. By the early nineteenth century, as 
the industrial revolution spread across the United States from its genesis in the eastern 
seaboard cities, wage work was often seen as little better than slavery.”). 
99 Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“In 
[cases of leases for land to be used for agriculture], the value of the lease to the tenant 
is the land itself. But in the case of the modern apartment dweller, the value of the 
lease is that it gives him a place to live. The city dweller who seeks to lease an 
apartment on the third floor of a tenement has little interest in the land 30 or 40 feet 
below, or even in the bare right to possession within the four walls of his apartment.”). 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. (“In order to reach results more in accord with the legitimate expectations 
of the parties and the standards of the community, courts have been gradually 
introducing more modern precepts of contract law in interpreting leases.”). 
103 Id. at 1075. 
104 Id. 
105 See, e.g., Kabil Dev. Corp. v. Mignot, 279 Or. 151, 156–57 (1977) 
(describing the standard objective theory of assent underlying contract law). 
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housing,106 such a benefit could be assumed as part of what the landlord 
agreed to provide, the written terms of the lease notwithstanding.107  
Moreover, by that time many cities had building safety codes and could 
penalize landowners who did not meet standards.108 Tenants, said the 
courts, could reasonably expect that the landlord would keep the leased 
premises in lawful condition.109 Thus, the implied warranty of habitability 
was born.110 Today, every residential landlord has a duty to keep the 
premises in sufficiently livable condition, and a failure to do so amounts 
to a breach of the lease agreement.111  
There are other examples of the effects of the contract revolution in 
landlord-tenant law, but the development of the implied warranty of 
habitability illustrates the point most relevant to this article: the common 
law has changed to accommodate modern circumstances and the unique 
challenges presented thereby, even when the change chips away at the 
historically unwavering nature of landlord property rights.112 
2. The Modern Right-to-Housing Movement 
There is a new revolution that aims even higher than the contract 
revolution. The right to housing movement seeks to have housing 
recognized as a fundamental and enforceable right.113 This movement, 
already gaining traction in parts of Europe and in the United Kingdom,114 
could have a variety of expressions and applications. But, some iterations 
 
106 Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970) 
(“When American city dwellers, both rich and poor, seek ‘shelter’ today, they seek a 
well known package of goods and services—a package which includes not merely 
walls and ceilings, but also adequate heat, light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing 
facilities, secure windows and doors, proper sanitation, and proper maintenance.”). 
107 Id. at 1077, 1080 (describing the implied warranty of habitability and 
reinforcing the principle based on public housing codes). 
108 Id. at 1080. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 1077. 
112 Sullivan, supra note 71, at 1296–97. 
113 See, e.g., Adams, supra note 23 (evaluating whether we need to recognize a 
formal right to housing). 
114 Kyra Olds, The Role of Courts in Making the Right to Housing a Reality 
Throughout Europe: Lessons from France and The Netherlands, 28 WIS. INT’L L. J. 
170, (2010) 183–94 (describing the nature of the right to housing in The Netherlands 
and France); Andrea B. Carroll, The International Trend Toward Requiring Good 
Cause for Tenant Eviction: Dangerous Portents for the United States?, 38 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 427, 451–52 (2008) (describing some features and results of the right to 
housing in the United Kingdom). 
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of the right would entail an expansion of “positive” rights of tenants at the 
expense of some “negative” rights of landlords.115 This subsection briefly 
explains the primary features and goals of this modern movement, some 
theoretical justifications for it, and how it could, if successful, undermine 
some of the traditional notions of property rights afforded to landlords in 
the United States. 
This movement identifies housing as a basic human right and seeks 
for governments to recognize it accordingly.116 It primarily addresses the 
problems of homelessness, eviction, and housing insecurity through the 
language of entitlement instead of charity,117 tackling the housing crisis 
not by relying on the generous (or even market-driven) actions of those 
with resources,118 but by giving enforceable rights to those deprived of 
adequate housing.119 Thus, a central goal of the movement is to provide a 
way for individuals to sue in court when they do not have an opportunity 
to occupy adequate housing.120 
One form of the right is enforceable against the government itself.121 
Several European nations have recognized such an iteration, but the 
substance varies.122 In France, for example, the right has been thought of 
as mostly aspirational.123 Occasionally a person may bring a successful 
suit, but usually the government may comply with the obligations of the 
right to housing simply by taking some affirmative steps to increase the 
availability of affordable housing.124 Others have viewed the right as 
stronger, with courts willing to find a violation when a government has not 
provided housing to a particular claimant who satisfies preconditions.125  
 
115 Adams, supra note 23, at 282–85. 
116 See, e.g., id. at 300–01; Lisa T. Alexander, Occupying the Constitutional 
Right to Housing, 94 NEB. L. REV. 245, 248 (2015). See also Carroll, supra note 114, 
at 477 (“At least nine countries now recognize the availability of decent housing as a 
basic human right.”). 
117 See generally Adams, supra note 23. 
118 Id. at 277 (“Rights protect needy persons in a way that does not depend on 
good will.”). 
119 Carroll, supra note 114, at 428 (describing one recent development in French 
law providing an enforceable right to adequate housing). 
120 Thomas Byrne & Dennis P. Culhane, The Right to Housing: An Effective 
Means for Addressing Homelessness?, 14 U. PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 379, 379–80 
(2011). 
121 Adams, supra note 23, at 290–93. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Byrne & Culhane, supra note 120, at 386. 
125 Id. at 383 (describing that the United Kingdom certain priority groups may 
have the right to have their application for government-provided housing to be 
approved). 
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Courts may order damages to be paid by the government to someone 
whose right to housing has been violated.126 But courts might hesitate to 
issue an injunction requiring the government to provide a claimant with a 
specific form of housing, perhaps recognizing the complex and expensive 
realities of providing housing when land and units are limited.127 
In some countries, though, a commitment to a right to housing is 
expressed through regulation of the private housing market.128 Rent 
control is typical.129 So is a prohibition on evictions under certain 
circumstances.130 France and Poland, for example, generally prohibit 
evictions during winter months when the consequences are particularly 
harsh.131 And courts in some countries will even prevent evictions on a 
case-by-case basis when homelessness or other severe consequences are 
likely to result.132 
Where does this right come from theoretically? One possibility is that 
the right to housing comes from the right to self-preservation.133 If 
evidence shows that homelessness significantly increases the chances of 
sickness or death (whether because of a heightened risk of infection, 
exposure to the elements, vulnerability to criminal activity, or in some 
other way),134 then perhaps minimally adequate housing is necessary for 
long-term survival. Another possibility is that the right to housing is 
derived from a right to liberty or the pursuit of happiness.135 Studies show 
that homelessness causes job loss, income reduction, and mental health 
 
126 Olds, supra note 114, at 179 (explaining how a Romanian court ordered the 
Romanian government to pay damages to a group of people whose right to housing 
had been violated). 
127 Byrne & Culhane, supra note 120, at 383 (explaining that the right to housing 
in much of Europe tends to generally encourage the production of additional 
affordable housing but does not tend to create a clear enforceable right in individual 
cases). 
128 Id. 
129 Carroll, supra note 114, at 440–41, 451–52 (explaining the nature of rent 
control measures in Italy and the United Kingdom). 
130 Id. at 446–47. 
131 Id. 
132 Alexander, supra note 116, at 253–54 (describing how the right to housing 
may call for limitations on evictions with homelessness could result); Carroll, supra 
note 114, at 442 (describing eviction suspensions in Italy). 
133 Adams, supra note 23, at 314–15 (explaining that adequate housing is linked 
to human health and safety). 
134 The evidence does indeed point to this. See, e.g., Effects of Poverty, Hunger, 
and Homelessness on Children and Youth, supra note 15. 
135 Adams, supra note 23, at 284 (discussing a positive right to liberty in the 
context of the right to housing). 
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issues like depression.136 Thus, to be without a home may mean a limited 
ability to pursue goals—career, personal, or otherwise.137 If the freedom 
to pursue such goals is central to a system of rights, then perhaps housing 
should be central too. 
Whether or not these theoretical foundations are effective to justify a 
right to housing, recognizing such a right in any meaningful sense may 
have stark consequences to traditional property rights.138 As many 
commentators have noted, to recognize a right generally means to 
recognize a corresponding duty.139 If the right is a “positive” right instead 
of a “negative” right, the corresponding duty is even more demanding.140 
In other words, if people have a positive right to housing, then someone or 
something has a duty to provide housing to those with that right.141 But 
housing does not fall from the sky ready to be used and adequate to satisfy 
needs. Housing units must be developed first. Existing units must be made 
available to those in need. If market forces and charity does not give 
everyone the opportunity to live in a satisfactory home, but the duty to 
provide housing to all must be satisfied, government intervention of some 
kind is likely necessary.  
Two main methods of government intervention may address the duty 
to provide housing. Both of them threaten traditional notions of absolute 
property rights, but in different ways. The first method is the classic tax 
and spend approach. Government may levy additional tax dollars to fund 
the public construction of housing units.142 Or it could use the funds to 
incentivize private property owners and developers to develop or rent out 
affordable housing units.143 This tax and spend method implicates property 
rights in an indirect way. It forces citizens to hand over their “property” as 
 
136 See Krent, supra note 18. 
137 Id. 
138 See generally Adams, supra note 23. 
139 Henry T. Terry, Legal Duties and Rights, 12 YALE L. J. 185, 188–89 (1903); 
Henry T. Terry, The Correspondence of Duties and Rights, 25 YALE L. J. 171, 174 
(1916). 
140 Adams, supra note 23, at 282–83 (explaining the nature of positive and 
negative rights and providing some examples). 
141 Byrne & Culhane, supra note 120, at 382 (explaining how a positive right to 
housing could at least require governments to actively pursue initiatives to increase 
the availability of adequate affordable housing). 
142 See, e.g., Public Housing Development, U.S. DEPT. HOUS. & URB. DEV., 
https://www.hud.gov/programdescription/phd [https://perma.cc/WUX6-3NMD] (last 
visited Sept. 6, 2021). 
143 See, e.g., Everett Stamm & Taylor LaJoie, An Overview of the Low-Income 
Housing Tax Credit, TAX FOUND. (Aug. 11, 2020), https://taxfoundation.org/low-
income-housing-tax-credit-lihtc/ [https://perma.cc/SUN9-ZETR]. 
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cash and to contribute to a project which the owners of the “property” do 
not directly benefit from and likely have not consented to. Most 
commentators have not considered tax and spend approaches to be 
particularly problematic, even though they may functionally infringe on 
property rights, because these methods are a necessity: the operation of 
government requires taxation.144 So, this familiar method of addressing the 
right to housing would not mark a dramatic shift in the law. Recognizing 
a right to housing in this realm would likely just mean that governments 
have a vaguely defined duty to create more affordable housing.145 
The second method of fulfilling a duty to provide housing is different. 
It requires private owners of residential property to make their space 
available to people in need of housing. The City of Barcelona, for example, 
sent a message to landlords: fill your spaces with tenants or we will rent 
out your properties for you at affordable rates.146 Some cities in the United 
States have taken a less extreme approach by outlawing or limiting short 
term rentals like Airbnb and VRBO.147 Such measures encourage people 
who own residential units in which they do not live to either sell the units 
or rent them out long term to locals.148 The appeal of this category of 
government action is that it takes advantage of abundant housing stock 
that already exists and simply encourages (or forces) the owners to put that 
stock to its best use.149 The drawback, of course, is that it represents an 
obvious  infringement on traditional property rights, i.e., the right to use 
and the right to exclude.150 Forcing landowners to rent out their units when 
they did not intend to do so, or to people they did not intend to welcome, 
 
144 See Eduardo Moisés Peñalver, Regulatory Taxings, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 
2182, 2182, 2184–85 (2004) (explaining the traditional understanding that taxation is 
a core broad power of government not largely subject to constitutional constraints). 
145 Olds, supra note 114, at 174 (explaining that the right to housing often 
amounts to more of a goal on behalf of the government to increase the stock of 
affordable housing). 
146 Jack Peat, Barcelona Tells Landlords: Find Tenants or We Will Rent Your 




147 Scott Zamost et al., Unwelcome Guests: Airbnb, Cities Battle Over Illegal 
Short-Term Rentals, CNBC (May 24, 2018, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/23/unwelcome-guests-airbnb-cities-battle-over-
illegal-short-term-rentals.html [https://perma.cc/AWS5-WM46]. 
148 Id. This is because any feasible alternative use for the property is made either 
illegal or less profitable by government action. 
149 By “best” use, I mean the use most consistent with the public good, not 
necessarily the most profitable. 
150 See Anderson, supra note 44, at 487. 
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limits both of those rights. Eviction moratoriums or prohibitions work in 
a similar way. Even states and cities in the United States have gone down 
this road, such as during the COVID-19 pandemic.151 Limitations on 
evictions beyond those self-imposed by lease agreement limit the property 
owner’s right to exclude.152 
At their core, all of these methods of securing a right to housing 
appear hostile to property rights and at odds with the United States legal 
system that favors negative rights and resists positive rights.153 The 
traditional right to property is a negative right because it states that owners 
of property have a general right to do (or not do) whatever they want with 
their property as long as it does not infringe on a negative right promised 
to others.154 In that way, a system of various negative rights can exist 
“peacefully.”155 At least in theory, such a system means that people may 
do what they want with themselves and their things if they do not bother 
others.156 If, however, a positive right is introduced, then a good of some 
form must be constructed and given to the entitlement holder, and 
everyone else may be obligated to help.157 
Positive rights are not unheard of in the United Sates legal system, 
but they are rare and limited in scope.158 A nearly unconditional and 
 
151 Dawn Baumgartner Vaughan & Ben Sessoms, NC Residents Will Be 
Protected from Pandemic-Related Evictions, Governor Says, RALEIGH NEWS & 
OBSERVER (Oct. 28, 2020), 
https://www.newsobserver.com/news/coronavirus/article246777297.html [] 
(identifying North Carolina’s eviction moratorium); Samantha Chatman, Landlords 
Claim Tenants Are Taking Advantage of COVID-19 Eviction Moratorium Order; 
Renters Rights Advocates Fight Back, WLS-TV CHICAGO (Oct. 29, 2020), 
https://abc7chicago.com/illinois-rent-eviction-moratorium-notice-chicago/7434650/ 
[https://perma.cc/6AXH-M2CR] (identifying Illinois’s eviction moratorium). 
152 Abby Vesoulis, How Eviction Moratoriums Are Hurting Small Landlords – 
and Why That’s Bad for the Future of Affordable Housing, TIME (June 11, 2020), 
https://time.com/5846383/coronavirus-small-landlords/ []. 
153 Adams, supra note 23, at 283 (explaining that “scholars have traditionally 
framed rights in the United States in terms of liberties, not positive rights”). 
154 Id. at 282 (explaining that liberties or negative rights typically involve the 
right to not be forced to do something, like give your money to someone else). 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 See id. at 282 (“In this conception, as recognized by H.L.A. Hart and others, 
‘rights’ are positive entitlements to something, while ‘liberties’ are freedom from 
something, including the freedom from having some of one’s money taken to support 
another person’s entitlements.”). 
158 Adams, supra note 23, at 282–83. Probably the most notable and strongest of 
these is a child’s right to an education, secured by many state constitutions. See, e.g., 
WASH. CONST., art. IX, § 1 (“It is the paramount duty of the state to make ample 
provision for the education of all children residing within its borders, without 
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fundamental positive right would certainly shake things up in the landlord-
tenant context. And if that positive right is to some form of property, then 
the property rights of others will necessarily be limited.159 That is likely 
why the right to housing has not been recognized in a meaningful sense in 
the United States.160 Thus, this article next seeks both to advocate and to 
mediate. Recognizing both the value of traditional property rights and the 
interest of secure housing for the less-well-off, it proposes a partial 
solution rooted in the common law that provides some security to the most 
at-risk renters and does not eviscerate the expectation interests of 
landlords. 
III. THE REMEDY AND ITS THEORETICAL SUPPORT 
The interests pursued by the modern right to housing movement are 
important. But the expectations of owners of residential property also 
should be respected so that property rights are not limited without thought 
and owners are not disincentivized from developing or renting homes to 
those in need.161 Most measures that seek to strike a balance between these 
interests advocate for legislative solutions like vouchers, affordable 
housing projects, Opportunity Zones, and other programs.162 This article 
sets to the side those valuable potential solutions and focuses on courts. 
The common law is characterized by the principle that the past is important 
but not iron shackles.163 That is no less true in the area of evictions. 
 
distinction or preference on account of race, color, caste, or sex.”); TEX. CONST., art. 
VII, § 1 (“A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preservation of the 
liberties and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature of the State to 
establish and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient 
system of public free schools.”). 
159 See Adams, supra note 23, at 282–83. 
160 Byrne & Culhane, supra note 120, at 380–81 (noting how the United States 
has not followed other nations in ratifying the United Nations International Covenant 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which enumerates the right to 
an adequate standard of living). 
161 Adams, supra note 23, at 284–85 (explaining that recognizing a right to 
housing might discourage market forces that could more effectively provide 
affordable housing). 
162 See supra notes 23–26 and accompanying text (describing some policy 
reforms advocated by various commentators). 
163 Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970) 
(“Courts have a duty to reappraise old doctrines in the light of the facts and values of 
contemporary life—particularly old common law doctrines which the courts 
themselves created and developed. As we have said before, ‘The continued vitality of 
the common law . . . depends upon its ability to reflect contemporary community 
values and ethics.'”). 
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Evictions should not be the default remedy in every case in which the lease 
agreement might call for it. There are some scenarios in which evictions 
over-privilege a landlord’s interests and take no consideration of 
countervailing interests. These include situations in which the landlord 
holds a substantial collection of residential properties, the relevant tenant 
likely faces homelessness, and the landlord is unlikely to make substantial 
productive use of the rental unit in the immediate future. In these cases, 
damages may be more appropriate. 
The common law of landlords and tenants can adapt to contemporary 
problems. The contract revolution and the resulting implied warranty of 
habitability gained traction when courts recognized that landlords were 
better able to maintain residential premises and that tenants reasonably 
expected an adequately safe home.164 The law should likewise address the 
modern eviction epidemic and conform remedies for tenant breaches to 
contemporary circumstances.165 
A. The Landlord’s Relationship to the Rental Properties 
The first contemporary circumstance to consider is the relationship 
of landlords to their properties. This relationship differs from landlord to 
landlord. Some landlords own one property, live on that property, and rent 
out a portion of it (like a bedroom or suite) to someone outside the 
household.166 Some landlords own hundreds or even thousands of rental 
units and do not live at any or even visit any.167 Many landlords fall 
somewhere in between.168 Moreover, some landlords could not live at or 
visit one of their properties if they wanted to because they are corporations, 
not natural persons.169 
The landlord’s relationship to her property should matter to the court 
when the court must decide how to handle a breach of the lease agreement 
by the tenant. Why? Because the landlord’s relation to a rental property 
determines the benefits the landlord may reasonably expect to receive 
from that property.170 A landlord who lives on site not only reaps income 
from a renter, but also may interact with renters regularly in the course of 
 
164 Sullivan, supra note 71, at 1296–97. 
165 See id. 




170 Maurie Backman, Pros and Cons of an Owner-Occupied Property  ̧MILLION 
ACRES (Feb. 4, 2021), https://www.millionacres.com/real-estate-investing/rental-
properties/pros-and-cons-owner-occupied-property/ [https://perma.cc/3SYC-N3J9]. 
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daily life.171 She may see the renter in the kitchen or out in the yard. She 
may talk to the renter and build a close relationship. In such circumstances, 
the landlord may have a particular interest in keeping her home free from 
people who break agreements with her.172 For such a landlord, utilizing the 
remedy of eviction in cases of rent arrears not only opens the possibility 
of re-acquiring a steady stream of rent, but it also allows the landlord to 
use her home more freely and to her own comfort—keeping everyone off 
the premises for some peace and quiet, or bringing in a new renter to fill 
that close relational space. 
The interests of a landlord who owns hundreds of apartments are 
somewhat different when one renter fails to keep up with rent payments. 
In that case, a landlord does not expect or intend to occupy the rental unit 
herself.173 The landlord never uses the property at all. Nor does she 
generally expect to replace the breaching tenant with another tenant for the 
sake of personal relationship. Indeed, she perhaps never even met the 
breaching tenant. Instead, the landlord’s primary interest is rent income.174  
For such “larger” landlords, then, eviction would appear to accomplish too 
much in some cases (and perhaps too little in some cases as well). The 
standard method of collecting owed money is to get a court order 
demanding payment.175 But eviction nominally declares the tenant is in the 
wrong, kicks the tenant out without question even though the tenant’s 
location may have little bearing on the landlord’s life, and, ironically, often 
does not help the landlord collect owed rent from the tenant.176  For a party 
who is primarily interested in making money off a rental property, then, 
eviction is sometimes a mismatched remedy. 
There is another way to look at the relationship of a landlord to rental 
units that may be helpful: in some cases the interest looks more like an 
interest in real property, and in other cases it looks more like an interest in 
 
171 Id. 
172 Id. Perhaps this is part of the reason why such landlords may be exempt from 
certain laws like the Fair Housing Act which would otherwise limit the landlord’s 
ability to determine who rents their units. See The Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 
ch. 45. 
173 I am speaking in general terms. Of course, a landlord would be within her 
rights to occupy any vacant unit she owned. 
174 Such landlords may have other secondary interests too, like tenant safety and 
property values. 
175 See Erin Eberlin, 12 Times a Landlord Can Sue a Tenant, BALANCE SMALL 
BUS. (Dec. 2, 2020), https://www.thebalancesmb.com/reasons-you-can-sue-your-
tenant-4144242 [https://perma.cc/QJY3-6TV6].  
176 See, e.g., Shaker & Assocs., Inc. v. Med. Tech. Grp., Ltd., 315 Ill. App. 3d 
126, 199 (2000) (explaining that “[a]s a general rule, eviction (whether actual or 
constructive) ends a tenant's obligation to pay rent”). 
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a collection of goods or services to be sold.  Recall that a property interest 
traditionally entails a “bundle” of rights, including the right to use.177  That 
is because people traditionally put land to productive use, whether through 
agriculture, development of homes or commercial units, or something else. 
Contrast that with an interest in a collection of goods. The owner may use 
some of the goods, but perhaps more likely the goods are acquired to either 
be put to another use to generate a new product, or to sell. In the case of 
large collections of residential units, the interest typically is just to 
generate income. The units are not used by the landlord, and indeed they 
are often not created by the landlord in the first place. They are acquired 
by the landlord to be “sold” for periods of time.  
Compare it to another valuable set of goods that is often leased: 
construction equipment like excavators and bulldozers.178  The owner of 
the equipment likely does not use the equipment herself and perhaps did 
not create the equipment. The owner owns all the equipment mainly to 
receive cash flow when others use it. In a sense, it does not much matter 
to the owner where the equipment is or how it is being used at a given 
time. The owner perhaps does not need the construction equipment itself 
at any given time; she wants the money due to her. For a landlord who 
owns numerous residential units, the situation is more like that of the 
owner of construction equipment than it is like the landlord who lives on 
the same property from which space is leased. 
The result of this analysis is the same as that mentioned before. If the 
primary interest is cash flow and not personal use of owned property, then 
a monetary remedy may make more sense than eviction.179 
Another look at history can help explain why a change in perspective 
is necessary. The leasehold estate came to be in the context of rural 
England.180 Tenants were given a right to subsist through farming as long 
as they gave the lord of that land rent.181 But rent at that time was often 
produce from the land itself, not money.182 The lord obviously needed food 
to survive. But things were not like they are today, when food can quickly 
 
177 See Anderson, supra note 44. 
178 See, e.g., Sunstate Equip. Co., LLC v. Hegar, 601 S.W.3d 685, 690 (Tex. 
2020) (referencing a company that leased construction equipment to Arizona 
customers). 
179 Of course, repossession of a tangible good is also a potential remedy for 
violations of personal property rights. Such remedies, and some of their implications, 
are discussed below. 
180 See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text. 
181 Weinstein, supra note 92 (describing how serfs would often pay “rent” by 
contributing a portion of the harvest to the feudal lord). 
182 Id. 
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be shipped nationwide and worldwide.183 A lord’s food likely had to come 
from the lord’s land or from somewhere else nearby.184 In that way, a 
lord’s interest in the land was not simply one of revenue generation.185 He 
needed that land specifically because of its nature as land.186 Lords for the 
most part, then, did not hold and relate to property as they would a 
commercial good, in which the nature of the item is somewhat irrelevant 
as long as it can provide cash flow. Thus, eviction may have made more 
sense as a remedy for feudal lords because they needed some control over 
the use of the land itself if they were to survive.187 When landlords later 
came to own land in the form of residential units, that changed.188 Such 
landlords often do not need to access and use the properties for their own 
livelihood; they instead need or want the cash flow the properties can 
provide.189 That interest does matter, but eviction does not always fit as a 
remedy to vindicate such interests as well as it perhaps fit for feudal lords. 
B. The Landlord’s Reasonable Expectations 
The second related consideration is the landlord’s expectation 
interests—what a landlord may reasonably expect out of a property at a 
given time. Perhaps a core idea behind eviction, especially in cases of rent 
arrears, is that the landlord has the right to replace a tenant who pays less 
with a tenant who pays more.190 Considering that a modern landlord’s 
interests are primarily based on revenue, such a right to replace makes 
some sense. However, a landlord’s expectations are not always reasonable. 
What a landlord hopes to get out of a property may not in every case reflect 






187 Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970) 
(“The assumption of landlord-tenant law, derived from feudal property law, that a 
lease primarily conveyed to the tenant an interest in land may have been reasonable in 
a rural, agrarian society; it may continue to be reasonable in some leases involving 
farming or commercial land. In these cases, the value of the lease to the tenant is the 
land itself.”). 
188 Id. 
189 See id. at 1077 (explaining the interests in urban residential lease properties, 
in contrast to those of classic agrarian leases). 
190 Although eviction may not be explicitly supported by courts in those terms, 
it seems that that is the justification, at least when the landlord does not intend to use 
the property at issue. 
191 The common law often elevates parties’ expectations, generally with the 
constraint that such expectations must be reasonable. See, e.g., Benjamin F. Boyer, 
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The reason for this distinction is simple. A landlord may hope to 
always have all of her rental units occupied by a tenant who pays full 
asking price, but the market may not provide such a continuous benefit.192 
In certain markets with excessively high demand for rental housing at a 
particular price point, a given landlord may have a waiting list of people 
to fill a spot immediately once it has been vacated through eviction.193 But 
in many cities and neighborhoods, a landlord will have to put forth 
considerable effort to fill a vacancy for her desired price.194 And it would 
require even more effort to fill the vacancy before the evicted tenant’s 
original lease term ends, especially if the eviction occurs late in the term.195 
Despite this reality, eviction addresses rent arrears as if the landlord 
will certainly be able to fill the unit with a paying tenant immediately after 
the unit is vacated.196 It forces out a tenant who provides less or no income 
to the landlord even though the unit may thereafter sit vacant, still 
generating no income to the landlord.197 If the eviction does not promise 
meaningful relief to the landlord, why dictate such a harsh outcome? 
One response, of course, is that at least eviction would give the 
landlord a chance to generate more income from the rental property.198 
True, but, as this article will later discuss, courts do not default to choosing 
severe injunction-like remedies based only on a chance that such a remedy 
is necessary to vindicate a complainant’s rights.199 The party requesting 
the severe injunctive relief should have a burden of showing the relief is 
necessary. In other words, landlords who want to evict a tenant who has 
not kept up with rent payments should be able to make some sort of 
minimal showing up front that doing so will probably allow them to regain 
 
Promissory Estoppel: Requirements and Limitations of the Doctrine, 98 U. PA. L. 
REV. 459, 459–60 (1950) (describing the contract doctrine of promissory estoppel). 
192 Dana Anspach, What to Know Before Buying a Rental Property, THE 




195 Id. If a tenant defaults and is evicted with one month remaining in the lease 
term, the landlord would have to bring in another renter providing greater cash flow 
more quickly than one month in order to fully justify the eviction from an economic 
standpoint. Id. 
196 Vesoulis, supra note 152. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
199 See infra Part IV. 
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cash flow, and to a greater extent than if the current tenant were allowed 
to stay.200 
There are at least two ways this could work from a remedies 
standpoint. First, perhaps a court could allow a struggling tenant to stay 
until the landlord does prove another tenant could likely fill the spot 
immediately. Second, a court could allow the tenant to stay until the end 
of the lease period originally agreed to and hold the tenant liable for a 
money judgment in the amount of rent they failed to pay. Either approach 
may have advantages depending on the case. But often the latter would 
better conform to the landlord’s interest in expected cash. 
A landlord may reasonably object to a damages approach, even if it 
in theory could adequately address her rights and expectations. A 
theoretical match is one thing, a landlord might say, but the real world is 
different. If a tenant is unable to keep up with rent now, why would we 
expect him to be able to pay a money judgment later? Won’t he simply be 
judgment proof, causing the landlord to miss out on cash flow entirely for 
the remainder of the original tenant’s lease? 
That is a real concern, but there are possible solutions to mitigate this 
effect. For example, a court could assess a money judgment against the 
tenant for the appropriate amount, and if the tenant is unable to pay 
promptly, other legal mechanisms like wage garnishment or security 
interests on personal property could be put in place.201 Wage garnishment 
is a common solution for addressing liabilities of poorer individuals.202  
Although federal law caps the percentage of wages which can be 
garnished,203 and thus landlords may receive their due more slowly than 
they prefer, wage garnishment could help ensure that the landlords do 
 
200 If the standard remedy under the common law is damages, then the party 
seeking an alternative remedy must demonstrate that remedy is necessary to vindicate 
her interests. 
201 Wage Garnishment, 7 NO. 8 HR COMPLIANCE L. BULL. art. 15 (Quinlan), 
Aug. 15, 2001 (explaining to employers that “[y]our employee might have lost a court 
case, be behind in child support, be in default of student loans, or simply owe a 
business or individual money. If a court has ordered you to garnish his or her wages 
to pay back the debt, you must obey”). 
202 Garnishment, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/wages/garnishments [https://perma.cc/Z697-
38WH].  If a tenant has no job and no real prospect of future employment, other 
collection measures should probably be explored instead. 
203 Fact Sheet #30: The Federal Wage Garnishment Law, Consumer Credit 
Protection Act’s Title III (CCPA), U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (Oct. 2020), 
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/WHD/legacy/files/whdfs30.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5UYA-AMJK] (explaining federal limitations on wage 
garnishment). 
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receive much of their due eventually. And that may be better than the 
alternative of kicking a tenant out (which generally discharges the tenant 
of the obligation to pay rent) and then struggling to find a new tenant who 
can pay. Some pay is better than none. Moreover, it may be a better 
alternative for a tenant who struggles to pay rent. The tenant would at the 
very least have a home, even if their wages are slightly reduced for a period 
of time. Reduced wages (or the loss of personal property) will often be 
preferable to having a permanent stain on the record that prevents the 
acquisition of future housing (which, again, often leads to a variety of 
other economic hardships).204 
If wage garnishment looks to be ineffective in certain cases, another 
possible solution to help landlords recover owed money is for tenants to 
take out rent insurance policies that would pay out if a court orders 
damages and garnishment is not feasible.205 Of course, such an approach 
could be a financial burden to the tenants most in need of help.206 So, 
governments and nonprofits perhaps could subsidize low-income tenants’ 
premium payments. This safeguard is obviously not court-enacted under 
common-law authority, the focus of this article, but legislative, policy, or 
charitable solutions like this (or other initiatives like Section 8 vouchers) 
are likely a necessary piece of the puzzle to ensure housing affordability 
on a larger scale. 
C. The Tenant’s Interests 
Of course, an eviction is often far more consequential to the tenant’s 
life and well-being than it is to the landlord’s, especially if the landlord 
owns a massive collection of properties.207 The tenant’s interests should 
not be cast aside entirely just because they fell behind on rent. As the 
introductory section discussed, an eviction is a serious and traumatic event 
 
204 Alexander, supra note 21, at 252–54. Garnishment may not be advantageous 
to a tenant if the tenant does have an opportunity to find adequate housing for a lower 
price after being evicted. A court deciding how to exercise its remedial discretion can 
evaluate all the “equities” in each case. 
205 See supra Part I. 
206 Id. 
207 See supra Part I. See also, e.g., Kristen E. Broady et al., An Eviction 
Moratorium Without Rental Assistance Hurts Smaller Landlords Too, THE 
BROOKINGS INST. (Sept. 21, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-
front/2020/09/21/an-eviction-moratorium-without-rental-assistance-hurts-smaller-
landlords-too/ [https://perma.cc/S4AK-8KPZ] (“larger, corporate landlords likely 
have relatively more financial resources to absorb a reduction or delay in rental income 
associated with the moratorium”). 
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for many tenants.208 It puts tenants in the position of having to find housing 
quickly.209 During that time other obligations like employment or school 
may be neglected.210 And having an eviction on record substantially 
impairs a tenant’s chances of finding adequate housing in the future.211 
Struck by financial hardship, homelessness, joblessness, danger, children 
falling behind in school, and even mental health concerns, evicted tenants 
suffer immensely.212 Indeed, the suffering may significantly exceed the 
value added to the landlord from the eviction.213 
In light of that bleak reality, eviction as a remedy often fails to take 
adequate account of tenants’ interests.214 It is one thing to say that a tenant 
is liable to fulfill his contractual duties to a landlord; it is another thing to 
kick him while he’s down—to say that he must get back on his feet 
somehow while not having secure access to many of life’s necessities 
which serve as preconditions for solvency and upward mobility.215 Even 
more, an evicted tenant may have children or other dependents.216 These 
other parties are often, understandably, unable to contribute to the 
resources that might help the tenant meet rent requirements.217 But they 
suffer anyway.218 They may miss school, hampering their chances of 
 
208 See supra Part I. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. 
211 Dana, supra note 2, at 937 (“[T]enants know that a formal eviction on an 
individual’s record makes finding decent new housing much, much more difficult. 
They understand that an eviction record is like a criminal conviction record--a stain 
that marks an individual as undesirable for a range of purposes.”). 
212 Swan, supra note 20, at 878–79. 
213 Dana, supra note 2, at 941. This, of course, may not be the case when the 
eviction does not result in homelessness and the landlord substantially relies on the 
funds from that rental unit to stay afloat. Broady, supra note 207. But, by and large, 
the comparison will instead be between significant loss on the one hand and minimal 
change to profit margins on the other. 
214 Swan, supra note 20, at 878–79. 
215 Id. (explaining that “[e]viction is ‘a severely consequential and traumatic 
event. Researchers have linked eviction to homelessness, material hardship, increased 
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graduating or getting an advanced degree.219 They may go hungry.220 They 
may be exposed to the elements, or to criminal activity.221 
That is not to say that a monetary remedy in place of eviction would 
not also present hardships to the tenant, but it would likely be better than 
the alternative.222 If a tenant is not forced to search for housing when she 
was not expecting to have to do so, she can dedicate time and resources to 
other things like food, school, and work.223 And in the future if the tenant 
does move on to a new housing arrangement, she will not have to work 
around a public record of past eviction, which substantially impairs the 
opportunity to secure housing moving forward.224 Even if the alternative 
remedy results in wage garnishment, the tenant can be assured that only a 
limited portion of her wages will be extracted,225 and that she will have a 
roof over her head in the process.226 
Not every tenant will suffer the same hardship if evicted. It is 
therefore important to at least distinguish between tenants who may face 
homelessness if evicted and those who likely would not. After all, in 
crafting the appropriate legal rule, all important interests should be 
considered. And in some cases, the interests of the tenant may not be 
compelling enough to justify a departure from the remedy preferred by the 
wronged party – the landlord who has suffered a violation of a lease 
agreement. For this reason, courts should sometimes opt for eviction when 
asked to by the landlord to remedy a lease breach. This may be especially 
true when a tenant violates a lease through some wrongdoing other than 
nonpayment of rent. When a tenant fails to pay rent, it is likely that the 
tenant is struggling economically (or will be soon) and thus may suffer 
 
219 Dana, supra note 2, at 937 (explaining that eviction “undermines poor 
people’s efforts to gain and maintain employment, and to provide their children 
something like a stable education and a sense of agency”). 
220 Effects of Poverty, Hunger, and Homelessness on Children and Youth, supra 
note 15. 
221 See id. 
222 See Rodriguez-Dod, supra note 16. 
223 Id. 
224 Swan, supra note 20, at 879 (“For low-income tenants, however, the mark of 
eviction on one’s record often prevents tenants from securing affordable housing in a 
decent neighborhood, and it disqualifies them from many housing programs.”) 
(internal quotation omitted). 
225 U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, supra note 202. 
226 To avoid incentivizing tenants to simply not pay rent, courts in their equity 
analysis may consider whether the tenant truly was unable to pay rent, or whether the 
tenant avoided doing so when capable. 
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severe consequences if evicted.227  But if a tenant violates a lease by, for 
example, conducting illegal activity on the leased property, or repeatedly 
damaging the property, eviction may be appropriate. In such cases eviction 
would still present a hardship, but it is less obvious that hardship will 
ultimately result in homelessness, job loss, or other serious 
consequences.228  
 
D. The Public’s Interests 
Briefly, the final set of interests hanging in the balance when an 
eviction could occur are those of the public. Eviction demands much from 
the public pocketbook.229 If, as Matthew Desmond persuasively argues, 
eviction is not just a condition of poverty but a cause of poverty as well,230 
then more evictions means more people seeking public housing, more 
people requesting unemployment benefits because of job loss, more 
people with health issues, and potentially more crime.231 Either 
government meets the demand caused by rampant eviction with sufficient 
taxpayer funded benefits, or the unaddressed harms radiate outward and 
cause problems for more and more of the public as homelessness 
spreads.232 
Again, the public interest will not necessarily be the same in every 
case. The bleak picture just described mainly applies when eviction leads 
to temporary or long-term homelessness.233 When it appears that eviction 
will do so, the public interest, like many of the other interests already 
described, would call for a monetary remedy rather than eviction. Most 
preferably for the public, this would mean the tenant must eventually pay 
what they were required to pay under the lease agreement. That option 
would absolve the public of putting forth any funds to rectify the situation. 
 
227 Judith L. Fox, The High Cost of Eviction: Struggling to Contain a Growing 
Social Problem, 41 MITCHELL HAMLINE L.J. OF PUB. POL’Y & PRAC. 3 (Symposium 
Issue) at 4 (2020). 
228 Id. 
229 Id. (“Eviction is also expensive for the landlords, neighbors, and society 
generally.”). 
230 Gross, supra note 22. 
231 See supra notes 13–20. 
232 Kate Santich, Cost of Homelessness in Central Florida? $31K Per Person, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL (May 21, 2014), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/os-xpm-
2014-05-21-os-cost-of-homelessness-orlando-20140521-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/VW2E-XLZM] (explaining that providing homes for homeless 
people would save public money in the long run). 
233 Swan, supra note 20, at 878–79. 
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Alternatively, the public could put forth the funds themselves through 
taxation so that the government covers the remainder of the tenant’s 
financial obligations to the landlord.234 That option is more expensive for 
the public than requiring the tenant to pay damages, but in the long run it 
may be cheaper than the alternative of allowing for eviction.235 
E. The Balancing Act 
A few core facts are clear, then, that provide the theoretical 
foundations for remedial alternatives to eviction. First, landlords have an 
interest in benefitting from their rental properties, but the contours of this 
interest can vary from landlord to landlord.236 Especially for landlords who 
own numerous properties and never substantially develop or make use of 
the properties themselves, their interest can sometimes be adequately 
addressed through a money judgment.237 Their relation to the property is 
more like that of a distributor to his goods than a person to their closely 
held personal property. Second, notwithstanding a landlord’s desire, a new 
tenant capable of paying the full asking value of rent may not always be 
readily available to fill an evicted tenant’s place.238 When that is the case, 
immediate eviction does not serve a substantial purpose for the landlord.239 
Third, tenants may suffer an extreme hardship if evicted, especially if an 
eviction (typically for rent arrears) would likely result in homelessness.240 
And finally, the public is burdened by homelessness and thus has an 
interest in alternatives to evictions in cases where homelessness is a 
substantial risk.241 
The core thesis of this article is that these principles justify the 
following overall approach: When a landlord owns many rental units and 
does not develop or use the rental unit at issue, when the landlord cannot 
show that they will likely fill the unit with a paying renter promptly after 
the tenant’s eviction, and when eviction would likely constitute an 
 
234 Matthew Yglesias, The Most Cost-Effective Way to Help the Homeless is to 
Give Them Homes, VOX MEDIA (Feb. 20, 2019), 
https://www.vox.com/2014/5/30/5764096/homeless-shelter-housing-help-solutions 
[]. Whether the care comes through charity or tax dollars, it is a public cost. Id. 
235 Id. Some evidence shows that securing housing for people who would 
otherwise be homeless is cheaper than dealing with the costs brought about by 
homelessness. Id. 
236 Broady, supra note 207. 
237 Id. 
238 Anspach, supra note 192. 
239 Swan, supra note 20, at 878–79. 
240 Id. 
241 Santich, supra note 232. 
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unusually serious hardship like homelessness, then a court should consider 
avoiding issuing an eviction order and issue a monetary judgment against 
the tenant instead. 
Another theoretical objection worth discussing is that property rights 
should be consistent; if someone truly has a property right, that right 
should be as strong for one property owner as the right of another in their 
property.242 Thus, it is inappropriate to treat some landlords differently 
than others, when all landlords should have the same rights over the 
property they own. 
Beyond the reasons I have already explained for treating some 
landlords differently than others, I will offer a couple areas from outside 
the common law proper in which the law does indeed treat landowners 
differently regarding the nature of their rights to their properties. The first 
is under the Fair Housing Act.243 Under the FHA, owners of residential 
rental units (as well as owners of residential properties listed for sale) may 
not discriminate in leasing to prospective tenants based on protected 
characteristics like race, sex, or religion.244 But the FHA allows for some 
notable exceptions. These include (1) owner-occupied buildings 
containing four or fewer units (the “Mrs. Murphy exemption”), and (2) 
single-family homes rented without a broker if the owner does not own 
more than three houses.245 The logical explanation for why these 
properties are exempt from the requirements of the FHA must be that, for 
these properties, the landlord has a much closer relationship to the rental 
unit than in other cases.246 Whether the landlord lives in the building 
containing the unit or only owns that unit and a couple others, the landlord 
is more likely both to interact with the tenant on a regular basis and to 
make personal use of the unit. Simply put, in these situations the landlord 
is more affected by precisely who occupies the unit, whereas landlords 
who own more properties and are more distanced from the units should 
care less about the nature of the occupants.247 
The second example comes from takings law. The Takings Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment declares that no property may be taken by the 
government for public use without paying just compensation.248 When a 
 
242 And, specifically, that the right should be unwavering or at least very strong. 
243 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. 
244 42 U.S.C. § 3604. 
245 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b). 
246 James D. Walsh, Reaching Mrs. Murphy: A Call for Repeal of the Mrs. 
Murphy Exemption to the Fair Housing Act, 34 HARV. C.R. -C.L. L. REV. 605, 607–
08 (1999) (describing the rationale of the Mrs. Murphy FHA exemption according to 
the Congressional record: to avoid regulating private personal relationships). 
247 Id. 
248 U.S. CONST., amend V, cl. 4. 
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claimant alleges that a regulation which may decrease her property value 
amounts to a “taking” of her property, the analysis is multi-faceted.249 One 
of the considerations a court will weigh when deciding whether the 
property has been taken is the extent to which the government action 
interferes with the property owner’s reasonable investment-backed 
expectations.250 Such expectations vary from property owner to property 
owner.251 Imagine a county passing a zoning ordinance that only allows 
for residential use in a particular geographic area.  A landowner may claim 
that when she purchased her property before the zoning ordinance, she 
expected to be able to use it to construct and run a hotel. But if that 
person’s land is in the middle of nowhere, away from any major 
thoroughfares or attractions, it would not be reasonable to expect that a 
hotel would attract many guests, and so her land’s value likely would not 
be substantially enhanced by the lifting of the new zoning restriction.252  
If, instead, a landowner purchases land right in the middle of a large 
globally-connected city and becomes subject to the same zoning 
regulation, perhaps that landowner’s expectations for developing and 
profiting from the land would be substantially greater and a takings claim 
would have a better chance of success.  
These two examples demonstrate that the law regularly treats a 
property owner’s rights in her property differently than it treats those of 
another property owner. Relevant factors that may cause the law to do so 
 
249 See Gregory M. Stein, Takings In the 21st Century: Reasonable Investment-
Backed Expectations After Palazzolo and Tahoe-Sierra, 69 TENN. L. REV. 891, 909 
(2002) (describing the various types of takings claims). Takings can take multiple 
forms. 10 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 231 (Originally published in 2006).  One is when the 
government actually takes title to property. Id. Another, discussed in this section, is 
when a government regulation on the use of property is especially burdensome. Id. 
Finally, a taking can result from the government causing a permanent physical 
occupation of private property. Id. 
250 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) 
(explaining that for regulatory takings claims, “[t]he economic impact of the 
regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has 
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant 
considerations”). 
251 See id. at 136–37 (identifying that the reasonable expectations of the 
particular property owner matter in the takings analysis). 
252 In Penn Central, for example, the Supreme Court held there was no taking 
from a regulation that prohibited the claimant from building a skyscraper above Grand 
Central Station because the Court held the owner could still make productive use of 
the property. Id. at 130 (noting that “the submission that appellants may establish a 
‘taking’ simply by showing that they have been denied the ability to exploit a property 
interest that they heretofore had believed was available for development is quite 
simply untenable”). 
35
Miller: A Common-Law Remedy for the Eviction Epidemic
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,
830 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
 
are the nature of the landowner’s relationship to the property, and the 
landowner’s reasonable interests in the property.253 Perhaps not 
coincidentally, those are the same primary considerations identified in this 
article as justifications for treating some landlords pursuing eviction 
differently than others.254 
F. Economic Incentives 
Most proposals for intervention into a market system run into a 
problem: will the intervention stifle the supply? In other words, in this 
case, will limiting a landlord’s options suppress the supply of private 
affordable housing? Some landlords may be dissuaded from renting to 
lower-income tenants if they know they might not be able to evict the 
tenant for nonpayment. Or, the landlord might demand additional 
compensation on the front end as insurance, which likewise could squeeze 
out many lower-income tenants. 
A few responses. First, I do not claim that the reforms suggested by 
this article should stand alone against the eviction epidemic. Other 
initiatives such as those targeted to increase the supply of publicly-funded 
or publicly-subsidized affordable housing are critical too.  Increasing the 
stock of such housing provides a safety net for struggling families and 
creates competition for private landlords who are interested in filling their 
cheaper units.255 Vouchers and other direct economic incentives to 
landlords who rent to such tenants are worth considering as well, as they 
can encourage landlords to rent out their units to people who otherwise 
may not qualify because of their income level.256 
Next, I believe unintended responses by landlords would be limited 
by the fact that the reform attempts to secure money damages. Landlords 
would not be without a remedy when a tenant fails to pay rent; they simply 
would be directed towards a monetary remedy. Granted, if the practical 
effect of a money judgment is that a landlord has to wait on processes like 
 
253 Stein, supra note 249, at 893. 
254 In short, the law and my proposed rule reflect the principle that property rights 
matter, but may be limited circumstantially. 
255 See, e.g., Rachel Pritchett, Landlords Say Housing Authority Stealing Their 
Renters, KITSAP SUN (Nov. 29, 2011), 
http://archive.kitsapsun.com/news/local/landlords-say-housing-authority-stealing-
their-renters-ep-417971482-356988871.html [https://perma.cc/3THA-5QLA]. 
256 Michael D. Eriksen & Amanda Ross, Housing Vouchers and the Price of 
Rental Housing, 7 AM. ECON. J. ECON. P. 154, 154 (2015) (concluding that housing 
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wage garnishment before getting paid, and if those processes do not yield 
the full debt to the landlord, this result would not be as beneficial to the 
landlord as evicting the tenant and immediately replacing him with another 
who can pay more.  But it would be better for the landlord than evicting a 
tenant and not getting paid at all. So, I see the money judgment and 
processes of collecting it as mitigating factors against undesired responses 
to economic incentives by landlords.  
In addition, any significant economic effects of this proposal on low-
income housing stock would be limited by the fact that this proposal itself 
would only apply in select cases. I argue for courts to consider a monetary 
remedy not any time a tenant falls behind on rent, but only when it is also 
the case that the landlord owns numerous rental units (and so it better 
situated to absorb isolated costs), and the landlord does not show it has 
another paying tenant lined up to fill the spot (thus the remedy I propose 
is not as significant of an economic hit as the landlord’s alternatives). 
Unintended ex ante measures by landlords may also be limited by the 
fact that these reforms would be judge-enacted, not legislative. It would 
be up to the judge to determine on a case by cases basis whether the 
conditions exist in which a monetary remedy instead of eviction is 
appropriate. At the time of the lease agreement, the landlord could only 
know that it might be limited to a monetary remedy, not that it would be 
for certain.  Similarly, it is significant that my proposal targets “larger” 
landlords, usually corporate entities that are more able to absorb temporary 
costs, even unexpected ones. The effect of my proposed remedy, in the 
limited cases it applies, would not be an indefinite tenancy at sufferance.257 
Although it could be implemented in various ways, as I have articulated 
the remedy it would last at least until a paying tenant is lined up to fill the 
spot, and at most until the end of the existing tenant’s original lease term. 
An analogy to rent control (likely a more extreme policy than this 
one) may be useful. Some evidence shows that jurisdictions implementing 
rent control have not secured more affordable housing than other 
jurisdictions.258  Nevertheless, rent control and other costs to landlords 
may encourage subdividing, or the conversion of rental housing to owner-
occupied housing.259 Subdivision, as long as regulations allow for it, can 
 
257 A tenancy at sufferance occurs when a tenant “remains in possession of the 
premises after termination of the lease [and] occupies ‘wrongfully.’” Bockelmann v. 
Marynick, 788 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Tex. 1990). 
258 See, e.g., John I. Gilderbloom & Lin Ye, Thirty Years of Rent Control: A 
Survey of New Jersey Cities, 29 J. URB. AFFAIRS 207 (2007). 
259 Daniel P. Schwallie, The Implied Warranty of Habitability as a Mechanism 
for Redistributing Income: Good Goal, Bad Policy, 40 CASE WESTERN RESERVE L. 
REV. 525, 536 (1989). 
37
Miller: A Common-Law Remedy for the Eviction Epidemic
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,
832 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
 
be a counterweight to rising costs.260 It may be more expensive for 
landlords to rent a unit, but when they respond by subdividing it into 
multiple units, the supply of units increases.261 And conversion to owner-
occupied housing is not always negative either.262  Landlords who decide 
to stop renting out units may sell them to families who want to own and 
occupy.  Because these units were rented at affordable rates, they may not 
sell for high prices and so perhaps allow for lower-income families to own. 
If so, then the demand of families looking to rent will decrease by one 
family per sale even as the supply of rental units decreases by one unit per 
sale. Obviously, many other factors influence the stock of affordable 
homes for sale and for rent, but the specific effects of rent control may not 
be as unilaterally harmful for affordable housing as many assume. And 
again, the remedy proposed in this article, which applies only in select 
cases and for short periods of time, would probably be even less 
economically consequential on housing supply than rent control. 
Another potential challenge stems from a desire to allow for private 
bargaining.  Landlords are not usually required to evict tenants when the 
lease agreement would allow it. Instead, they presumably choose to do so 
because they think it is in their interests. If so, is any court intervention 
necessary to ensure that tenants are only evicted if the landlord has 
someone else lined up to fill the spot? And, conversely, if the landlord was 
not so optimistic, couldn’t she bargain with the tenant to allow the tenant 
to stay (such as by forgiving a portion of owed rent if the tenant was able 
to pay some of it immediately)?  
A brief response: first, if the landlord is right about being able to fill 
the spot vacated by an eviction, she could make that showing to a judge, 
such as by presenting rental applications for that unit or other indications 
of interest. Just because landlords will sometimes be right about future 
business prospects does not mean courts cannot verify. Second, if the 
landlord is right about not being able to fill the vacant spot promptly, she 
could still bargain with the tenant before resorting to court action. Faced 
with either eviction or something like wage garnishment as a legal remedy, 
a landlord may decide it is in her best interests to allow the tenant to stay 
for, e.g., a portion of owed rent paid right away. Landlords may reasonably 
 




262 Maurie Backman, Pros and Cons of an Owner-Occupied Property, MILLION 
ACRES (Feb. 4, 2021), https://www.millionacres.com/real-estate-investing/rental-
properties/pros-and-cons-owner-occupied-property/ [https://perma.cc/G55Y-VNJP]. 
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opt for guaranteed, but less, cash sooner instead of the chance at more cash 
down the road. 
Another concern is that of policies discouraging tenants from paying 
rent. If a tenant is poor enough to be functionally judgment proof, then 
perhaps they would take advantage of any sort of protections against 
eviction and simply not pay. But I believe the proposal as I have articulated 
it can mostly avoid this problem. Most significantly, the proposal applies 
when a landlord cannot show that they have a paying tenant lined up to fill 
the existing tenant’s spot. The existing tenant would likely have no reliable 
way of knowing whether the landlord is in a position to replace them, so 
the tenant probably could not know whether they might be subject to a 
monetary remedy instead of eviction until a court decision saying so. 
Tenants would still have the incentive to pay rent to the extent they are 
able. But in any event, another safeguard could be put in place to further 
ensure incentives are proper: courts could limit the alternative remedy I 
propose to cases in which tenants have made a reasonable effort to pay 
rent in the past. Courts could assess the tenant’s income and expenses 
during the tenancy and determine whether the tenant has been improperly 
neglecting rent payments when they could have paid more. Courts make 
similar inquiries regarding other debts, such as whether someone seeking 
to discharge loan debt has made a good faith effort to repay it.263 
To summarize, any policy that makes it more costly for landlords to 
rent their units at affordable rates could negatively impact the supply of 
affordable units. But the limits I have articulated for this proposed remedy 
would significantly mitigate the effect, especially compared to the mixed 
effect of more severe measures like rent control. And if programs like 
Section 8 are not neglected, then undesirable landlord responses to 
economic incentives could be eliminated almost all together. Incentive 
programs on the front end may do enough on their own if sufficiently 
robust, and the remedy I propose on the back end can work as a crucial 
bandage to stop some of the bleeding without substantially upsetting 
affordable housing stock. 
IV. COMMON LAW JUSTIFICATION 
Perhaps the preceding section would seem all well and good if a 
jurisdiction were seeking a rule to govern landlord-tenant relationships a 
priori. But, of course, law already exists in this topic area. This law, as 
 
263 See, e.g., Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Serv. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 
(2d Cir. 1987) (when deciding whether a party may discharge her student loan debt in 
bankruptcy proceedings due to undue hardship, considering whether “the debtor has 
made good faith efforts to repay the loans”).  
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described earlier, finds its roots in both property and contract principles 
well-established in the common law.264 And courts, many would say, 
cannot or should not simply fashion a new principle out of thin air because 
they think it is logical. That would potentially amount to “judicial 
activism.”265  This section addresses that concern.  It explains that although 
this article advocates that courts take an “active” role in securing tenants’ 
interests against the hardships of eviction, courts need not necessarily be 
“activist” to do so.266 Instead, the common law of both contract and 
property provides various potential foundations from which to pursue this 
new approach. There may not be an obvious line from common-law 
doctrines to my proposed remedy, but there is sufficient support from 
common-law principles to make the connection without rebuilding law 
from the ground up. 
A. Supporting Principles from Contract Law 
This subsection first explains why a court opting for an alternative 
monetary remedy to eviction in certain circumstances could conform to 
default principles of contract law. Then, recognizing that eviction is often 
provided for in a lease’s very terms, this subsection explores why various 
principles of contract law could nonetheless dictate that an eviction clause 
not be enforced in some circumstances. Overall, the goal of this subsection 
is to provide justification from the contemporary law of contracts for 
courts to enforce alternative remedies to eviction. 
1. Applying the Traditional Approach to Contract Remedies 
The standard approach to remedies in the event of contract breach is 
to seek damages instead of any other sort of remedy.267  Section 359 of the 
Second Restatement of Contracts states that specific performance or an 
injunction will not be ordered when damages are sufficient to satisfy the 
 
264 Supra Part II. 
265 See, e.g., Caprice L. Roberts, In Search of Judicial Activism: Dangers in 
Quantifying the Qualitative, 74 TENN. L. REV. 567, 572 (2007) (describing how 
judicial activism may be conceived as the deviation from established principles of law 
such as statutes or precedent). 
266 By this I mean that although implementation of my theory would likely not 
happen absent judicial intervention, judges would be within the common law tradition 
to do so. 
267 Jimenez, supra note 41, at 1313–14. 
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interests of the injured party to a contract.268 So, damages is the default 
contract remedy.269 And, the standard approach to measuring contract 
damages is based on the nonbreaching party’s expectations.270  
Expectation damages aim to put the wronged party to a contract in as good 
a position as they would have been had the breaching party fully 
performed his obligations.271 
Thus, to determine how contract law would typically handle a breach 
of a landlord-tenant agreement from a tenant’s failure to pay rent, we must 
determine what the landlord reasonably expected to get out of the bargain. 
That, of course, is almost always rent money.272 Assuming the landlord 
approaches the lease agreement in the way most landlords who do not live 
on or use the rental property would approach it, the landlord expects to be 
paid an agreed-upon amount either monthly or under some other specified 
timetable.273 
Under the default principles of contract law, then, a court considering 
how to resolve a lease dispute resulting from rent arrears should order 
damages—damages measured by the amount the landlord should have 
received based on the terms of the contract, minus the amount the tenant 
already paid to the landlord.274 According to the standard approach, that is 
all the court has to do, unless it determines that damages would be 
inadequate to protect the expectation interests of the landlord.275 As a 
general rule, the most a landlord would reasonably expect from a lease 
agreement is to be paid the amount of money contemplated by the lease 
agreement by the time specified in the lease agreement.276 That 
expectation would be largely satisfied not only if a tenant never fell behind 
on rent, but also if a tenant who did fall behind on rent were ordered by 
the court to pay what he owes, as long as mechanisms were put in place to 
 
268 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 359(1) (Am. Law Inst. 1981) (“Specific 
performance or an injunction will not be ordered if damages would be adequate to 
protect the expectation interest of the injured party.”). 
269 Id. 
270 Id. at § 359 cmt. a. 
271 U.S. Naval Inst. v. Charter Commc'ns, Inc., 936 F.2d 692, 696–97 (2d Cir. 
1991) (discussing the appropriate expectations damages in that case). 
272 It could be any sort of valid consideration for giving rights over the property 
to the tenant. 49 AM. JUR. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 91. 
273 Anspach, supra note 192. 
274 See 49 AM. JUR. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 91. This computation puts the 
landlord in as good of a position as she would have been had the tenant fulfilled all 
his obligations. 
275 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 359(1) (Am. Law Inst. 1981). 
276 49 AM. JUR. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 91. 
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ensure that such payments are actually made (perhaps with some interest 
added on).277  
Indeed, even if a court determined damages were inadequate to 
satisfy a landlord’s expectation interests,278 it is hard to see how it could 
require “specific performance” by the tenant as an alternative to damages.  
Specific performance is a remedy that requires the breaching party to do 
what they promised to do in the contract.279 A tenant promises to pay 
rent.280 Thus, a court that ordered specific performance would functionally 
order the same thing as if it had chosen damages. In either case the tenant 
is obligated to pay the amount of money the landlord expected to receive 
as rent.281 
The only exception to this identical nature of specific performance 
would be if the eviction clause of a contract were itself interpreted as one 
of the tenant’s obligations.282 In other words, perhaps the court might read 
the clause allowing for eviction as an agreement by the tenant to be kicked 
off the property if he fails to pay rent. But that seems like an implausible 
construction of that contract provision. An eviction clause appears to 
simply be a stipulation of an available remedy if the tenant’s substantive 
 
277 Interest may be appropriate to ensure that the landlord capitalizes on the “time 
value” of money (although it may not be the finder of fact who includes this element). 
Argonaut Ins. Co. v. May Plumbing Co., 474 So.2d 212, 215 (Fla. 1985) (holding that 
“it is a purely ministerial duty of the trial judge or clerk of the court to add the 
appropriate amount of interest to the principal amount of damages awarded in the 
verdict.  We conclude that the finder of fact should not consider the time-value of 
money in its consideration of damages”). 
278 The Second Restatement of Contracts identifies some criteria for determining 
whether damages are adequate: the difficulty of proving damages with reasonable 
certainty; the difficulty of procuring substitute performance; and the likelihood of not 
collecting the damages award. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360 (AM. L. 
INST. 1981). Under these considerations, damages may appear inappropriate in some 
cases because the tenant does not have enough money to pay them. Id. However, 
because the performance sought (renting the unit) could be accomplished by others, 
and because the units in some cases are not particularly unique, I believe damages is 
still justified much of the time. See Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 82–83 
(3d Cir. 1948) (emphasizing that the uniqueness of the good or performance sought 
matters to the decision of whether to grant specific performance); Klein v. PepsiCo, 
Inc., 845 F.2d 76, 80 (4th Cir. 1988). 
279 Jimenez, supra note 41, at 1321–22 (identifying specific performance as an 
in-kind restorative remedy). 
280 Lease, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
281 See Bryan Foster, The Purpose of Criminal Evictions: Applying the Theories 
of Punishment to Arkansas’ Criminal Eviction Statute, 2018 ARK. L. NOTES 1993 
(2018) (“The expectation damages resulting from a tenant’s failure to pay rent would 
be the rent owed to the landlord.”). 
282 See Wilkie v. Banse, 88 N.W.2d 181, 185 (Neb. 1958). 
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obligations are not met, not a substantive obligation itself.283 Nevertheless, 
even if ordering an eviction could be construed as a form of specific 
performance, it is not at all clear that such a remedy would always better 
serve the landlord’s expectation interests than damages would.284 The 
landlord would have to show that kicking the tenant off the property would 
enable the landlord to recover much of the expected revenue for the 
remainder of the tenant’s lease period.285 As discussed above in Part III, 
market realities will sometimes render that expectation reasonable, but 
often will not.286 
Overall, if standard principles from the common law of contract were 
applied to a tenant breach of a lease agreement resulting from nonpayment 
of rent, eviction would often not be the preferred remedy.287 Instead, the 
law may favor an approach more like the one described in Part III. 
Damages to satisfy the landlord’s expectation interests would sometimes 
be a better fit.288 
2. Applying Common-Law Counterweights to Contract Terms 
Even if the common law of contracts would favor a remedy like 
damages over one like eviction, the problem still remains that eviction is 
typically provided for expressly in the terms of the lease agreement.289 
How, then, could default rules from the common law enter the equation at 
all when the contract’s terms seem to settle the matter? The answer is that, 
in some special cases, common law principles can control even when a 
contract’s terms would demand a different approach or result.  
The most famous of these principles is unconscionability. That 
principle states that under certain circumstances the terms of a contractual 
agreement will not be enforced because it would be unconscionable to do 
so.290 The principle takes two primary forms: procedural and substantive 
 
283 See Polk v. Buckhalter, 258 So. 3d 816, 818–19 (La. Ct. App. 2018) (referring 
to eviction as a remedy). 
284 See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
285 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359 (AM. L. INST. 1981). 
286 See supra Part III, Section B. 
287 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359 (AM. L. INST. 1981). 
288 See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
289 See, e.g., Interstate Realty Mgmt. Co. v. Price, 86 So. 3d 798, 801 (La. Ct. 
App. 2012); Bentley-Kessinger, Inc. v. Jones, 367 S.E.2d 317, 318 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1988); Dominski v. Frank Williams and Son, LLC, 46 A.D. 3d 1443 (N.Y. S. Ct. 
2007); Keller Williams Realty v. Melekos, No. 2015CA0679, 2015 WL 6951406 (La. 
Ct. App. 2015). 
290 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“If a 
contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court may 
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unconscionability.291 This subsection will apply both of these to the case 
of lease agreements that call for eviction in the event of rent arrears. 
Procedural unconscionability is widely recognized.292 The doctrine 
applies when something went wrong in the procedure of the parties’ 
relationship, usually surrounding the forming of the agreement, that makes 
it unjust to enforce part or all of the agreement later on.293 Such procedural 
defects can take many forms and usually arise in cases in which the party 
against whom the contract is later enforced did not make a meaningful 
choice at the bargaining stage.294 One blatant example of this would be if 
a third party ordered someone to agree to certain terms with someone else, 
or else the third party would harm them or their family.295 Contract law at 
its foundation assumes multiple parties have freely agreed to a set of 
terms.296  If it turns out that at the time of the agreement one of the parties 
was not free but instead agreed to a set of terms out of compulsion, the 
foundations of contract would be undermined and the law can treat the 
contract as ineffectual.297 
But another less obvious case in which procedural unconscionability 
might apply is when one party is driven to accept a contract term or terms 
not because a gun is held to their head, but because their life circumstances 
do not give them any other real options.298 For example, a person might 
 
refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract without 
the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any unconscionable term 
as to avoid any unconscionable result.”). 
291 Melissa T. Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism—The Sliding 
Scale Approach to Unconscionability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 1, 6 (2012) (identifying 
the procedural and substantive elements of unconscionability). 
292 Indeed, the Restatement’s explanation of unconscionability weighs towards 
the procedural. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. L. INST. 1981). 
293 Lonegrass, supra note 291, at 9 (explaining that procedural unconscionability 
focuses on the bargaining stage). 
294 Id. (stating that courts look for evidence “indicating that the transaction 
lacked meaningful choice on the part of the complaining party”). 
295 See, id. (explaining that pressure tactics by one party may lead to procedural 
unconscionability). 
296 Steven W. Feldman, Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements, Freedom of 
Contract, and the Economic Duress Defense: A Critique of Three Commentaries, 64 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 37, 62 (2015) (“’Freedom of contract’ means parties have the right 
to bind themselves legally; it is a judicial concept that contracts are based on 
mutual agreement and free choice.”). 
297 See Lonegrass, supra note 291, at 9; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 208 (AM. L. INST. 1981). 
298 I find general support for this broader understanding of procedural 
unconscionability from the classic opinion of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture 
Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (“Whether a meaningful choice is present in a particular case 
can only be determined by consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the 
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agree to finance a car they want to own at a rate so high that the person 
could never actually afford the car in the long run.299 The person might 
agree to do so because they have no car and absolutely need one to get to 
work and earn money, and because their credit rating is poor and nowhere 
else would give them a favorable interest rate. It is a difficult question 
whether such a person enters a contractual agreement with sufficient 
freedom to render the contract enforceable.300 On the one hand, the person 
does decide to enter the agreement when technically she could have 
refused and tried to continue life without the vehicle she needed. On the 
other hand, if the car is so necessary that she likely would not have income 
(and then eventually could lose housing, food, and worse) without it, then 
the circumstances do share some similarities to those of a person being 
forced into an agreement at gunpoint. 
This conception of procedural unconscionability is likely broader 
than that which many courts would accept. But it is not an unthinkable 
way to understand procedural unconscionability,301 and so it is worth 
evaluating eviction through this lens. Take for example a person entering 
a residential lease agreement. She is struggling to get by, working long 
hours at a grocery store to provide for the immediate needs of herself and 
her two children.302 She owns no car, and only one bus line passes near the 
store where she works. A couple weeks ago she was kicked out of a shelter 
because one of her children was caught stealing food from another resident 
for the second time. Since then she and her children have been sleeping in 
the living room of the home of an acquaintance who is gracious but has 
made clear they have only three more days before they must move on. The 
woman has diligently searched rental postings in a local paper but has not 
found many options. In fact, she has found only one option that is both 
cheap enough for her to afford the first month’s rent and in a location 
connected to adequate transit for her to get to work. 
The desperate tenant contacts the property’s landlord, who owns 
dozens of other rental properties across the city. The landlord is prepared 
 
transaction. In many cases the meaningfulness of the choice is negated by a gross 
inequality of bargaining power.”). 
299 See generally De La Torre v. CashCall, Inc., 422 P.3d 1004, 1007 (Cal. 2018) 
(holding that loan interest rates can amount to unconscionable terms when sufficiently 
high). Although the California Supreme Court in that case did not focus only on 
procedural unconscionability, it did explain the circumstances surrounding loan 
agreements were relevant to its unconscionability decisions. Id. at 1009–10. 
300 Id. (framing “meaningful choice” under a procedural unconscionability 
analysis broadly). 
301 Id. 
302 This hypothetical is likely not an unusual scenario, unfortunately. See supra 
notes 12–18 and accompanying text. 
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to lease the property to her for three months. But the landlord makes clear 
orally and in the written lease terms that if the woman falls behind on rent 
payments, the landlord can evict her. The woman agrees. “What was the 
alternative?” she thought. Her boss told her she would be fired if she 
missed work again because she was searching for housing. Her children 
have eaten only fast food and the occasional granola bar for the past 
several weeks because she has no kitchen in which to store and prepare 
other food. All three of them have gotten sick at least once because of lack 
of sleep and exposure to the rain and cold. If she did not enter this lease 
agreement, she and her kids might not make it much longer. 
Did this woman meaningfully choose to enter the lease agreement 
with the eviction term included? In one sense, of course she did. She made 
a decision in the interests her family’s health and wellbeing. In another 
sense, the hard circumstances of life metaphorically held her at gun 
point—if the alternative is unacceptable is the decision truly free? 
Needless to say, such philosophical questions are beyond the scope of this 
article. But what matters for now is that some courts have demonstrated 
an openness to the broader conception of procedural unconscionability 
that would support the argument that an eviction term in such 
circumstances should not be enforced.303 
The other form of unconscionability in the common law of contract, 
is substantive unconscionability.304 Substantive unconscionability, for 
those courts which recognize it, applies when the enforcement of a 
contract’s terms themselves seems unacceptable and egregiously unfair.305  
For some courts, a defendant in a contract dispute must show both 
procedural and substantive unconscionability to escape enforcement of a 
contract term; i.e., the defendant must show both that the circumstances of 
the agreement itself were strikingly unfair, and that the result of enforcing 
the agreement would be strikingly unfair as well.306 Other courts may 
entertain an assertion of substantive unconscionability alone.307 
Classic examples of contract terms giving rise to substantive 
unconscionability include certain damages caps, penalties, and extreme 
 
303 See Williams, 350 F.2d at 449. 
304 Id. at 449–50 (describing that not only is the fairness of the bargaining 
positions an element of unconscionability, but so is the overall fairness of the terms). 
305 Lonegrass, supra note 291, at 16 (explaining the most common conceptions 
of substantive unconscionability). 
306 Id. at 11 (“The conventional approach to unconscionability has been to 
invalidate a contract or provision only when strong evidence of both procedural and 
substantive unconscionability is present.”). 
307 Id. at 19 (describing the “substantive unconscionability alone” approach 
taken by some courts). 
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prices.308 In such situations, courts sometimes reason that the term is “such 
as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make [the 
agreement] on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept 
[it] on the other.”309 That is the traditional approach to substantive 
unconscionability.310 In the courts’ view, the shocking terms of the 
contract themselves are evidence that something went wrong at the 
bargaining stage.311 
But the threshold for substantive unconscionability is lower in some 
jurisdictions.312 In these jurisdictions, enforcing a contract may be deemed 
substantively unconscionable if doing so seems strikingly unfair.313 New 
Mexico, for example, has rejected the typical high threshold for 
substantive unconscionability and opted for a standard more like one of 
“unreasonable one-sidedness” or “commercial unreasonableness.”314 In 
Cordova v. World Finance Corporation of New Mexico, the New Mexico 
Supreme Court stated that substantive unconscionability “focuses on such 
issues as whether the contract terms are commercially reasonable and fair, 
the purpose and effect of the terms, the one-sidedness of the terms, and 
other similar public policy concerns.”315 Under that standard, the court 
declared unenforceable an arbitration clause that allowed a wide range of 
options for one party asserting a breach, but only allowed arbitration for 
the other party.316 In the court’s view, that arbitration clause was so 
imbalanced in favor of one party that the court could declare it 
unenforceable without even considering procedural unconscionability.317  
Under this broader conception of substantive unconscionability 
followed by some courts,318 eviction may seem especially problematic. If 
a court is, like those in New Mexico and other places like Illinois, willing 
to consider “the purpose and effect of the terms, the one-sidedness of the 
 
308 Id. at 53 (explaining that liquidated damages provisions are common culprits 
leading to substantive unconscionability). 
309 Id. at 16. 
310 Id. 
311 Id. at 19. 
312 Id. at 16. 
313 Id. (“Where courts once routinely required “conscience-shocking” or 
“outrageous” unfairness to support a finding of substantive unconscionability, courts 
employing a sliding scale increasingly look to whether the terms are “unreasonably 
one-sided” or “commercially unreasonable.”). 
314 Id. 
315 Cordova v. World Fin. Corp. of N.M., 208 P.3d 901, 907 (N.M. 2009). 
316 Id. at 904. 
317 Id. at 910. 
318 Illinois, for example, follows a similar approach to New Mexico. Kinkel v. 
Cingular Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250, 268–69 (Ill. 2006). 
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terms, and other similar public policy concerns,”319 then it could 
presumably consider whether the eviction would bring substantial 
hardship on a tenant, whether eviction would be more substantial of a 
remedy than necessary to make the landlord whole, and other related 
considerations. In practice, courts have not generally explored a 
conscionability limitation on evictions.320 But this subsection 
demonstrates that such an approach would not be far out of the 
mainstream, especially under a substantive unconscionability analysis.321 
Other common-law principles limit the enforcement of contract 
remedy provisions specifically. The first of these principles worth noting 
is the requirement of certainty of damages.322 This principle states that for 
a plaintiff to be entitled to a damage award for breach of contract, the 
plaintiff must be able to prove with reasonable certainty that it actually 
suffered such damages.323 This idea is fundamental to the law of 
contract.324 The court’s role in the event of a breach is to ensure that the 
nonbreaching party is compensated for what it lost, and generally for no 
more.325 The principle of certainty thus ensures that a harmed plaintiff is 
not overcompensated.326 The classic example in which an injured party 
may have trouble ensuring the certainty of damages is a case in which the 
injured party claims the defendant’s breach caused her to lose profits.327  
 
319 Cordova, 208 P.3d at 907. 
320 The North Carolina Court of Appeals did, only to be overruled by the state’s 
supreme court. E. Carolina Reg’l Hous. Auth. v. Lofton, 789 S.E.2d 449, 452 (N.C. 
2016) (“Contrary to the Court of Appeals’ decision, the equitable defense of 
unconscionability is not a consideration in summary ejectment proceedings. To 
prevail in a summary ejectment proceeding under North Carolina law, a landlord must 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a tenant breached the lease.). 
321 A contract may also be unenforceable on the ground that its enforcement 
would be contrary to public policy. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 365 
(AM. L. INST. 1981). However, for as long as state statutes allow for summary 
ejectment actions, it will be hard to prove an eviction under such a statute would 
violate the public policy of the state. 
322 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (AM. L. INST. 1981) 
(“Damages are not recoverable for loss beyond an amount that the evidence permits 
to be established with reasonable certainty.”). 
323 Id. 
324 Matthew Miliknowsky, A Not Intractable Problem: Reasonable Certainty, 
Tractebel,and the Problem of Damages for Anticipatory Breach of a Long-Term 
Contract in a Thin Market, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 464 (2008). 
325 GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 16 (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 2d 
ed. 1995) (“Money damages for breach of contract were to be ‘compensatory,’ never 
punitive . . . .”). 
326 See Milikowsky, supra note 324, at 464. 
327 Isbell v. Anderson Carriage Co., 136 N.W. 457, 462 (Mich. 1912) (explaining 
that it is difficult to prove damages from lost profits with sufficient certainty). 
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Lost profits are hard to prove because they are speculative; it is often hard 
to know for sure how much money a nonbreaching party would have made 
had the breach not occurred.328  
The principle of certainty applies primarily to damages.329 Thus, it 
does not map onto eviction neatly. But the underlying idea may still apply 
and counsel courts to avoid enforcing an eviction provision in some cases. 
As previously discussed, if a contract remedy is designed to make a 
nonbreaching party whole, then the justification for an eviction must be 
that a landlord would make productive use of the property almost 
immediately after evicting the tenant.330 But if the landlord would not 
actually use the property right away, or were not able to find a replacement 
tenant immediately, then a remedy that kicks out an existing tenant before 
the original lease term specified fails to give the landlord what they are 
really missing, rent money. Conversely, a remedy like damages in the 
amount of unpaid rent would satisfy the principle of certainty because that 
number is a sure thing.331 The court can know exactly how much money 
the landlord should have been paid by the tenant.332 
Relatedly, eviction may in some cases contravene the principle 
underlying common-law limits on stipulated or liquidated damages.333 
Stipulated damages provisions specify what the breaching party must pay 
if it breaches.334 They are often used when the actual value of damages 
would be difficult to prove, like if the expected harm to a nonbreaching 
party would be loss of profit.335 One significant limitation is that for a 
liquidated damages clause to be enforced, an actual loss must have been 
suffered or reasonably anticipated.336 Also, a court may refuse to enforce 
a liquidated damages provision if it finds the provision requires a much 
greater payment than is necessary to make the injured party whole.337 
Because eviction is a separate remedy from damages, it  would not 
obviously be subject to the traditional common-law limits on liquidated 
 
328 Michael D. Weisman & Ben T. Clements, Protecting Reasonable 
Expectations: Proof of Lost Profits for New Businesses, 76 MASS. L. REV. 186, 186–
88 (1991). 




333 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (AM. L. INST. 1981). 
334 Id. 
335 See id. 
336 Id. (“Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement 
but only at an amount that is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual loss 
caused by the breach and the difficulties of proof of loss.”). 
337 Id. 
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damages.338 But eviction is a stipulated remedy that in theory has a certain 
value.339  Of course, a landlord has suffered actual loss if a tenant has fallen 
behind on rent; the landlord has lost the value of rent for a period of time.340 
But, as noted multiple times in the article, eviction often costs the tenant 
far more than the rent arrears costs the landlord.341 If a court determines 
that under the circumstances of a particular case that is true—for example, 
if $1,000 for one month of rent backpay would make the landlord whole, 
but eviction frees up the rental property for five months (worth $5,000) 
moving forward—the common law limitations on stipulated damages give 
a reason to go with another remedy that better reflects the realities of the 
situation.342 
The rule against penalties is very similar.343 Like with the principle 
of certainty and the limitation on stipulated or liquidated damages, the rule 
against penalties rests on the conviction that contract law is about making 
a nonbreaching party to an agreement whole.344 A penalty, which indeed 
often arises as a non-enforceable stipulated damages clause, is a remedy 
that costs the breaching party more than the loss suffered by the 
nonbreaching party.345 And a penalty need not be strictly financial,346 
especially if it serves as a deterrent to breaching. 
A simple way to evaluate whether eviction is an improper penalty in 
a given case is to ask two questions.347  First, is eviction or damages (likely 
in the value of unpaid rent plus interest) more costly to the tenant?  If 
damages are more costly, eviction is likely not an improper penalty 
 
338 Evict, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) 
339 See Kamel v. Wambua, 984 N.Y.S.2d 337, 338–39 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) 
(referring to the “deterrent value” of eviction). 
340 See In re Kocher, 78 B.R. 844, 851 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987) (referring to rent 
as “the quintessential measure of the time value of real property.”). 
341 See, e.g., supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
342 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (AM. L. INST. 1981). 
343 See id. (describing the rule that penalties under contracts are generally against 
public policy). 
344 Id. § 356 cmt. a. 
345 See Wasserman’s, Inc. v. Twp. of Middletown, 645 A.2d 100, 105–06 (N.J. 
1994) (describing penalties as sums that extend beyond the realm of actual 
compensation into the realm of punishment or deterrence). 
346 In re Graham Square, Inc., 126 F.3d 823, 828 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating that 
principal features of penalties are their lack of proportional relation to actual damages 
and their design to coerce performance). Although penalties almost always are 
financial, the central requirement is that they have some economic value beyond what 
is necessary to compensate the harmed party. Id. 
347 I am not aware of courts or other commentators using this formulation to 
determine a penalty, but it seems to me to be an effective means of determining 
whether a remedy extends beyond compensation and into the realm of deterrence. 
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because it does not overshoot the value of what the landlord lost. Second, 
if eviction is more costly, does damages satisfy the landlord’s expectation 
interests? Assuming the landlord only “uses” the property for generating 
rental income, the answer will often be yes. And if it is indeed the case 
that damages would compensate a landlord adequately, then to choose a 
remedy that is more costly to a tenant could amount to an unreasonable 
penalty. 
Granted, it may seem unusual to evaluate the propriety of a remedy 
based on the breaching party’s views towards that remedy instead of the 
nonbreaching party’s views. But I assume under this approach that the 
court would determine first that the alternate remedy, damages, could 
indeed satisfy the landlord’s expectation interests to a sufficient degree. 
So, the landlord’s interest in the remedy would be adequately addressed. 
Once that is settled, nothing inherent to contract law would prevent a court 
from addressing which remedy, out of all remedies that could adequately 
compensate a plaintiff, would cause the least unnecessary additional 
hardship to the defendant.348 
3. The Contract Approach Summarized 
All in all, eviction poses some problems to contract doctrine. It 
deviates from the standard default approach to contract remedies, which 
favors damages over other remedial measures.349 Thus, a contract purist 
could hold that damages and not eviction should be the preferred remedy 
for rent arrears.350 But what about freedom of contract? Lease agreements 
typically allow for eviction in the event of rent nonpayment.351 The 
common law of contract has a response to that too.352 As a general matter, 
courts have substantial discretion over choosing the appropriate remedy, 
especially when a party seeks a remedy that is more injunctive in nature.353  
More specifically, eviction may be unconscionable in some cases, either 
because the tenant had little to no choice but to enter the lease agreement, 
 
348 See David S. Schoenbrod, The Measure of an Injunction: A Principle to 
Replace Balancing the Equities and Tailoring the Remedy, 72 MINN. L. REV. 627, 
636–37 (1988). 
349 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359 (AM. L. INST. 1981). 
350 Id. 
351 See, e.g., Interstate Realty Mgmt. Co. v. Price, 86 So. 3d 798, 801 (La. Ct. 
App. 2012); Bentley-Kessinger, Inc. v. Jones, 367 S.E.2d 317, 318 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1988); Dominski v. Frank Williams and Son, LLC, 46 A.D. 3d 1443 (N.Y. S. Ct. 
2007); Keller Williams Realty v. Melekos, No. 2015CA0679, 2015 WL 6951406 (La. 
Ct. App. 2015). 
352 See Schoenbrod, supra note 348, at 636–37. 
353 See id. 
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or because the tenant would suffer an unreasonable hardship from the 
eviction compared to the benefit the landlord would receive from the 
eviction (or some combination of both).354 And, relatedly, the common law 
welcomes scrutiny from the court into particular stipulated remedies when 
those remedies appear unnecessarily harsh or disproportionate to the harm 
suffered by the landlord.355 
B. Supporting Principles from Property Law 
The last subsection considered how the alternative to eviction 
advocated in this article may conform to the existing structures of contract 
law. This subsection approaches the issue through the lens of property law. 
Although the most natural understanding of property rights would support 
eviction in many cases of rent arrears, some common-law principles push 
towards damages instead.356 This is especially true if a landlord’s interest 
in a rental unit is more like that of an interest in an item of personal 
property or chattel than traditional real property, which I argue is often the 
case.357 
The common law of property provides for a variety of remedies to 
vindicate property rights. The proper remedy depends on the type of 
property at issue and the owner’s interest in that property.358  The common 
law remedy most obviously relevant to this article is called ejectment.359  
Ejectment is a court order to vacate or relinquish occupancy of a 
premises.360 Under the common law, a person can bring an action for 
ejectment against a trespasser on her property if damages would be 
inadequate to vindicate the property owner’s interests.361 Traditionally this 
 
354 See supra notes 12–18 and accompanying text. 
355 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (AM. L. INST. 1981). 
356 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 359, 362–67 (AM. L. 
INST. 1981). 
357 See Lezell v. Forde, 891 N.Y.S.2d 606, 614 (Sup. Ct. 2009) (questioning 
whether an apartment lease should be treated as real property or personal property and 
the consequences of the decision). 
358 Id. at 613. 
359 Davis v. Westphal, 405 P.3d 73, 82 (Mont. 2017) (“In modern form, common 
law ejectment is an action at law brought against a trespasser in possession of all or a 
portion of real property for immediate possession of the property based on proof of 
superior title and the right to immediate possession.”). 
360 See id. (describing ejectment of a means of claiming immediate possession 
to property). 
361 See, e.g., ROBIN C. LARNER, EQUITABLE RELIEF; EJECTMENT, 14 GA. JUR. § 
24:16 (2020) (“The general rule is that equity will interfere to restrain a trespass when 
the injury is irreparable in damages, or the trespasser is insolvent, or other 
circumstances exist which, in the court's discretion, render the interposition of the writ 
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remedy is favored to rectify not one-time trespasses, but repeated or 
ongoing trespasses when a damages award would not deter future trespass 
by the defendant.362 
Eviction functions similarly to ejectment in the context of the 
landlord-tenant relationship.363 In the eyes of the common law, then, 
eviction secures a landlord’s interests in ways that damages perhaps 
cannot.364  Or, at least, eviction would be appropriate when damages would 
not sufficiently satisfy a landlord’s interests but removing the tenant from 
the property would.365 Thus, eviction for rent arrears sometimes, but not 
always, would be supported by the default principles of the common law 
of property. It would be so supported when the landlord intends to use 
many of the sticks in the bundle of property rights in the rental property—
if the landlord would use or sell the property if the tenant were not there.366  
But when damages may satisfy a landlord’s interests, ejectment might not 
have common law support.367 As with contract law, property law often 
favors making a plaintiff whole through money damages as opposed to 
injunctions.368 So if a landlord has no interest in the property besides an 
intention to find a replacement renter to bring back the flow of rent 
payments, ejectment in the form of eviction may not be preferable.369 
The most common alternative to ejectment in property law is a 
trespass action.370  Like an ejectment action, a trespass suit seeks to address 
the harm caused by a person present on real property without permission 
or after permission expired.371 It differs from ejectment in that it generally 
seeks damages from the trespasser, not removal (usually when a trespass 
action for damages is brought, the trespasser no longer remains on the 
property, but that is not a necessary feature of such actions).372 As a unique 
 
necessary and proper, among which will be the avoidance of circuity and multiplicity 
of actions.”). 
362 Id. (“Equity may enjoin a continuing trespass to land.”). 
363 TAMMY E. HINSHAW & RACHEL M. KANE, EVICTION DISTINGUISHED FROM 
EJECTMENT, 22 STAND. PA. PRAC. § 120:3 (2d ed. 2020). 
364 See supra note 361 and accompanying text. 
365 See supra note 361 and accompanying text. 
366 Id. This is because only when the landlord so intends will it be necessary to 






372 St. Louis Cty. v. Moore, 818 S.W.2d 309, 310 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) 
(referencing “the common law right to sue for trespass and collect actual and punitive 
damages”). 
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feature of property law, a plaintiff who successfully proves trespass is 
generally entitled to damages even if she cannot prove that the trespass 
harmed her or the property.373 Trespass guarantees at least nominal 
damages.374 If the plaintiff can prove harm, even economic harm, then she 
will generally be entitled to damages for the value of the harm.375  Trespass 
liability therefore serves both a symbolic and compensatory function. A 
court will declare a plaintiff’s right has been violated in any case in which 
they suffer a trespass, but it will not do anything of much practical 
significance unless the plaintiff shows they have actually been harmed.376 
Such an action is probably the closest existing property law corollary 
to the approach I suggest in this article.377 In the landlord-tenant context, 
a trespass action would work as follows: once the tenant violates the lease 
agreement (such as by failing to keep up with rent) the tenant’s interest in 
the property nominally reverts back to the landlord, because the lease 
agreement says so.378 Thus, the tenant loses the rights to use and exclude 
and the landlord regains the full bundle of sticks, including the right to 
exclude.379 At that point, the tenant is a trespasser unless the landlord gives 
him permission to remain.380 If a landlord brought a trespass action for 
damages against the tenant, the landlord would certainly be entitled to 
nominal damages.381 But the landlord would be entitled to additional 
damages in the amount which she can prove was caused by the tenant’s 
overstay.382  
The amount of harm would depend on what benefits the landlord 
could not obtain because the tenant remained on the property.383 This 
would, of course, vary from case to case. If the landlord lived on site or 
used the site for her own personal endeavors, then the tenant’s overstay 
may limit the exercise of such rights and factor into a damages award. But 
if the landlord, for example, owned many rental units and never personally 
used them, then presumably the primary damages the landlord could prove 
would be those resulting from being unable to rent out the property to 
 
373 Grygiel v. Monches Fish & Game Club, Inc., 787 N.W.2d 6, 19 (Wis. 2010) 
(explaining that trespass entitles a claimant to nominal damages). 
374 Id. 
375 Id. (explaining that a claimant may collect any compensatory damages they 
can prove from a trespass). 
376 Id. 
377 See supra Part III. 
378 See supra Part II.A. 
379 See supra Part II.A. 
380 See supra Part II.A. 
381 See supra note 372 and accompanying text. 
382 See supra notes 372–73 and accompanying text. 
383 See generally supra Part III.A. 
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someone who could pay more than the existing tenant. Importantly, this 
calculation may be different than the calculation of damages if the same 
situation were evaluated under a contract approach. Under the contract 
approach, the landlord could certainly be entitled to a damages award in 
the value of the rent payments for the remainder of the breaching tenant’s 
lease, because that is what the landlord would have received had the 
tenant’s obligation been performed.384  But under property law, and under 
a trespass approach specifically, the lease agreement is out the window 
once the tenant breaches.385 From that point on, the landlord simply has 
the standard set of property rights over the rental unit. Damages would be 
calculated not based on how much income the landlord could have earned 
if the tenant had satisfied the rental obligation, but based on how much the 
tenant’s overstay harms the landlord from the moment the lease agreement 
vanishes onward.386 Thus, under this approach, a landlord should recover 
the full value of the remainder of the rent payments only if she can show 
that the tenant’s overstay prevented the landlord from filling that unit with 
another full paying renter for the entirety of that period. The landlord could 
demonstrate this with, for example, evidence of interest in the property by 
prospective tenants such as rental applications. 
A few other significant remedies from the common law of property 
generally apply to personal property instead of real property. They are 
worth mentioning, though, because, as discussed in Part III, theoretical 
justifications exist to treat certain landlords’ interests in certain rental 
properties more like an interest in chattel than an interest in closely held 
land.387 Two of these remedies for violations of personal property rights 
are replevin and trover. Replevin (or, its close sibling, “detinue”), 
analytically the personal property corollary to ejectment, requires the 
wrongful holder of the chattel to return it to the owner.388 Trover, the 
personal property corollary to trespass, requires the wrongful holder of the 
property to pay the owner for what she has taken.389 Trover was thought 
 
384 See supra Part IV, Section A. 
385 This is because, under the conveyance view of leases, when the terms of the 
conveyance call for reversion to the landlord, reversion occurs and the terms have 
served their purpose. See supra notes 68–71 and accompanying text. 
386 See supra notes 68–71 and accompanying text. 
387 See Part III supra. 
388 Laprease and Fuentes: Replevin Reconsidered, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 886, 886 
(1971) (explaining that replevin is “[m]ost frequently used today to effect summary 
repossession of a chattel purchased under a conditional sale contract”). 
389 Taylor v. Morgan, 3 Watts 333, 333 (Pa. 1834) (explaining a way to calculate 
damages in a trover action). Trover seeks damages because the action is generally used 
when the defendant no longer has the property. History of the Distinctions Between 
Trespass, Detinue, and Trover, 18 HARV. L. REV. 402, 402 (1905) (“The action 
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to be the standard remedy when the wrongful holder of the property had 
already converted it to his own use.390 
In cases in which a landlord’s interest in the rental unit is more like 
an interest in chattel,391 and when the tenant instead of the landlord is more 
likely to make productive use of the property for the immediate future, an 
action more like trover might make sense over one like replevin. Of 
course, trover does not map onto such a situation in a perfectly clean way. 
With trover, damages may make sense because the defendant has already 
converted the property to another use.392 For example, a defendant may 
wrongfully hold some of the plaintiff’s lumber, but by the time the plaintiff 
sues, the defendant has already made a boat out of that lumber. It would 
be impossible for the defendant to return that precise lumber to the plaintiff 
in its original form, and it would be impractical or inefficient to require 
the defendant to go out and find substantially similar lumber and give it to 
the plaintiff. So, damages to the plaintiff makes the most sense. 
When a tenant breaches a lease agreement because of rent arrears, the 
tenant has not converted the property; the rental property still exists. Thus, 
it would not be impossible for the tenant to return the precise property to 
the landlord. However, it may be impractical or inefficient. If a landlord 
only “uses” the property by renting it out and generating income, then 
money is primarily what the landlord is due. The question, then, is whether 
the remedy of eviction is a practical or efficient way to make sure the 
landlord gets paid for the remainder of the lease period. If the landlord 
already has a tenant ready to move in and pay full price, that may be the 
case. If the landlord does not, then damages would more likely fit the logic 
of the distinction between trover and replevin.393  
The overall point is this: under the traditional approach to property 
law remedies – whether dealing with personal property or real property – 
damages instead of eviction makes more sense as long as the landlord is 
not likely to make immediate use of the property or immediately rent it out 
to a paying replacement tenant. 
But that is not the end of the discussion. A particular remedy may 
make sense, but that remedy may not be the one the plaintiff seeks. If a 
 
of trover is founded upon a conversion, which, according to our modern ideas, may 
occur through an unpermitted taking of chattels, by a wrongful detention of them, or 
by an unlawful disposition so that neither the owner nor the wrong-doer has any 
further control over them.”). 
390 Id. 
391 See Part III supra. 
392 See supra note 389. 
393 Of course, eviction may be inefficient on a broader scale as well, if society 
has an interest in keeping people housed and homelessness costs more in the long run 
than securing housing up front. 
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plaintiff seeks one particular remedy, shows her legal right has been 
violated, and thus under the law may be entitled to the requested remedy, 
the court must grant it, right? Not necessarily. Especially in actions in 
which common-law principles apply, courts are endowed with 
considerable remedial discretion.394 They can consider a wide set of policy 
considerations that implicate the interests of the parties to the case, as well 
as others who have an interest in the remedy.395 And one common-law rule 
that guides this discretion, which we have already seen in the contract 
context, is that damages are the preferred remedy over injunctions 
whenever damages are adequate to satisfy a plaintiff’s interests.396 For the 
reasons that have been discussed, damages are sufficient in some cases in 
which the landlord seeks an eviction. 
Indeed, one notable feature of property law is that it sometimes makes 
an exception to the absolute right to exclude when such an exception is 
necessary to serve another important end or when enforcing the right to 
exclude would violate public policy.397 In the famous case of Ploof v. 
Putnam,398 a family was sailing on a lake when a strong storm blew in.399  
The family tied their boat to a dock on another person’s property to try to 
avoid shipwreck.400 The property owner’s servant promptly untied the boat 
and the boat crashed into the shore, injuring the family on board.401 The 
Vermont Supreme Court held that the property owner wrongly had the 
boat untied because the necessity exception to the right to exclude 
applied.402 “[The] doctrine of necessity,” the court said, “applies with 
special force to the preservation of human life.”403 
Similarly, in State v. Shack,404 the Supreme Court of New Jersey held 
that a property owner could not exclude from his property two nonprofit 
workers who sought to provide legal and medical services to migrant 
workers housed there.405 The court explained that: 
 
394 In particular, judges have significant discretion when asked to grant a form 
of injunctive relief. See Schoenbrod, supra note 348, at 635–380. 
395 Id. at 636–37. 
396 Davidson Bros., Inc. v. D. Katz & Sons, Inc., 579 A.2d 288, 307 (N.J. 1990). 




401 Id. at 188–89. 
402 Id. at 189. 
403 Id. 
404 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971). 
405 Id. at 374–75. 
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Property rights serve human values. They are recognized to that end, 
and are limited by it. Title to real property cannot include dominion 
over the destiny of persons the owner permits to come upon the 
premises. Their well-being must remain the paramount concern of a 
system of law. Indeed the needs of the occupants may be so imperative 
and their strength so weak, that the law will deny the occupants the 
power to contract away what is deemed essential to their health, 
welfare, or dignity.406 
Thus, some courts have been willing to recognize exceptions or 
limitations on the right of landowners to exclude others from their property 
when such exclusion would potentially threaten human health and 
safety.407 Because eviction may similarly lead to considerable hardship 
and health and safety concerns, even if less immediately than in these 
cases, it would not be farfetched to think a court may limit a landlord’s 
right to evict a tenant in some special cases, especially when it could order 
a damages award instead. 
As a final note for this subsection, it is worth mentioning that the 
remedial approach for which I advocate may appear to generally contradict 
the theoretical framework made famous by Calabresi and Melamed.408  
Under that theory, and those which have expounded on it, “property rules” 
are to be favored over “liability rules” when transactions costs are low.409 
In the case of a landlord tenant dispute over rent arrears, transactions costs 
would likely be low. Usually only two parties would need to negotiate, 
and, because they would probably have a preexisting relationship of some 
form, it would not be particularly difficult for them to do so. 
Nevertheless, even under an approach that prioritizes economic 
efficiency, such a simple analysis may be worth questioning.410 As 
Calabresi and Melamed themselves explain,  
It should be clear that most entitlements to most goods are mixed. 
Taney’s house may be protected by a property rule in situations where 
Marshall wishes to purchase it, by a liability rule where the 
 
406 Id. at 372. 
407 See, e.g., Ploof, 71 A. at 188; Shack, 277 A.2d at 369. 
408 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 55. 
409 Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An 
Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 718 (1996) (identifying, though 
questioning, the standard perspective that property rules should be used when 
transactions costs are high and liability rules when costs are low). 
410 Kaplow and Shavell question the standard transactions costs analysis. Id. 
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government decides to take it by eminent domain, and by a rule of 
inalienability in situations where Taney is drunk or incompetent.411 
But why is “Taney’s house” protected by a liability rule when the 
government wants to take it by eminent domain? Presumably, the answer 
is not because bargaining costs between the owner and the taker (the 
government) would be high; only two parties are officially involved. 
Instead, in my view, the answer must be one of two things.  One, the parties 
who have a relevant interest in the transaction are actually more numerous 
than only the two officially involved. Specifically, because a taking by the 
government is done for the public interest,412 the interested parties are all 
those who may benefit from the property being removed from the 
exclusive control of the private owner. And conceived in that way, 
transactions costs would be high, because such costs may have to account 
for bargaining with all these additional persons. Second, perhaps the house 
would be protected by a liability rule in the case of a taking because, 
practically, the government must have the power of eminent domain for 
the sake of the public interest, and a property rule would entirely 
undermine eminent domain (because a property rule would allow the 
owner to hold his property unless he freely gives it up).413 Under either 
justification, a property rule may be displaced by a liability rule because 
the public interest in some way requires it. 
The damages remedy for which I advocate in this article is not a 
taking as traditionally conceived. But the same principle may apply. 
Although only two parties, the landlord and the tenant, are primarily 
involved in the transaction which could allow for a tenant to stay on the 
landlord’s property, the interests of other parties matter too. This is 
especially true when a tenant’s dependents are in the picture. It also may 
be true when an eviction would likely cause homelessness. Homelessness 
is a concern of all who live in a jurisdiction in which it occurs. 
Homelessness is associated with higher crime rates and thus draws on 
government resources funded by the public’s tax dollars.414 For this 
reason, it may indeed be impractical to facilitate actual negotiation 
between a landlord who wants to evict someone and all parties affected by 
 
411 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 55, at 1093. 
412 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477–78 (2005) (explaining the 
public purpose requirement for the exercise of eminent domain power under the 
Takings Clause). 
413 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
414 M. Price, New Insights on Homelessness and Violence, AM. PSYCH. ASS’N 
(Dec. 2009), https://www.apa.org/monitor/2009/12/violence [https://perma.cc/8LND-
9N83]. 
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the eviction epidemic. Thus, a liability rule may be justified in place of a 
property rule. 
Additionally, the remedy I recommend does resemble a taking in a 
certain way. The government, this time through the court instead of the 
legislature or executive,415 declares that a landlord must continue to rent 
out the property to the existing tenant for at least part of the remainder of 
the lease term. But, instead of the government compensating the landlord 
through tax dollars, the government may order the tenant to retain liability 
for that monetary value. 
Overall, principles underlying common law property remedies may 
support a deviation from the eviction default in some cases when a tenant 
fails to keep up with rent payments.416 As across the common law, 
damages are the preferred remedy over injunctions whenever damages 
adequately compensate the plaintiff for what it has lost.417 And when a 
party seeks some form of injunctive relief, courts have considerable 
discretion to evaluate whether such relief is appropriate.418 When the 
landlord does not use all the property rights it has in the rental property, 
but instead only seeks to generate income from it, a money judgment may 
be sufficient to secure its interests.419 And although the landlord’s interest 
in its land might traditionally be protected by a property rule, requiring its 
consent to deprive it of any rights to the property, the broader harm to the 
public caused by evictions may justify a liability rule instead.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Eviction in the United States presents an intimidating problem. How 
can we secure adequate housing for people who may suffer homelessness 
and other grave consequences, while also respecting the expectation 
interests and property rights of private landlords who provide the large part 
of low-income housing stock? Although commentators have focused 
extensively on questions of homelessness and housing affordability, most 
 
415 See Ilya Somin, Stop the Beach Renourishment and the Problem of Judicial 
Takings, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 91 (2011) (discussing the relatively new 
concept of judicial takings). 
416 See supra Part IV, Section B. 
417 See supra notes 268 and 361 and accompanying text. 
418 See supra notes 268 and 361 and accompanying text. 
419 See supra notes 268 and 361 and accompanying text. And if a tenant cannot 
pay the judgment, the landlord may still see much of its interests secured through other 
mechanisms like wage garnishment and security interests on personal property. Of 
course, landlords may not prefer such mechanisms. Landlords’ preferences for 
remedies matter and should often be accommodated, but they are not the end all be all 
when the preferred remedy is injunctive in nature. 
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proposed solutions focus on legislative or other policy action.420 Rent 
control, eviction moratoriums, the eradication of single-family zoning, 
voucher programs, public housing, and other policy initiatives are 
important pieces of the puzzle. But courts can play a role too. Just as courts 
operating under the common law saw the new challenges presented by 
urbanization and thus developed landlord-tenant law to secure greater 
rights for tenants, so too they can develop landlord-tenant law on the 
remedies side of the equation to meet this modern crisis.421 
From a theoretical perspective, a landlord’s property rights, though 
important, are neither unwavering nor the only relevant consideration. 
When a tenant fails to keep up with rent payments, the remedy blessed by 
the court also implicates (1) the landlord’s relationship to the property, (2) 
the landlord’s reasonable expectations regarding benefits from the 
property, (3) the potentially excessive hardship a tenant could suffer if 
evicted, and (4) the burden on the public when a person is pushed into 
homelessness.422 Specifically, landlords may relate to their rental 
properties in a way that is more like that of an owner of chattel who never 
uses the chattel but simply generates income from others using it. This is 
especially true of landlords who own numerous rental units and neither 
live on nor use any of them.423 When such a rental unit is at the center of 
a rent arrears dispute, the primary concern of the landlord is restoring lost 
cash flow.424 Eviction may be inappropriate, then, because it always makes 
the assumption, which sometimes is not warranted, that the landlord will 
be able to find a paying replacement tenant immediately. It thereby both 
fails to secure the money due to the landlord and kicks out a tenant in dire 
circumstances without asking whether doing so truly helps make the 
landlord whole. Damages, on the other hand, could address some of the 
reasonable interests and expectations of the landlord without rendering the 
tenant homeless. Because eviction often does burden the tenant more than 
it benefits the landlord, and because the public has an interest in 
widespread housing security, a monetary remedy could help remedy the 
eviction epidemic. 
Not only does such an approach make sense as a matter of theory, but 
it also finds some support in historical common-law approaches to 
remedies. Contract law favors damages when they adequately satisfy an 
 
420 See supra Part II, Section B. 
421 See supra Part I. 
422 See supra Part II, Sections A–D. 
423 See supra Part II, Section A. 
424 See supra Part II, Section A. 
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injured party’s expectation interests.425  And even when a lease agreement 
specifically calls for eviction, contract law provides various mechanisms 
under which such a provision sometimes should not be enforced, like 
unconscionability and limitations on penalties and stipulated remedies.426 
Likewise, under the common law of property, damages and similar legal 
remedies are favored over injunctive relief when they sufficiently restore 
to property owners the value of the rights they have lost.427 And, even 
under the substantive law of property, the right to exclude must sometimes 
give way when human health and safety hang in the balance.428 Under the 
common law as a whole, courts have considerable remedial discretion, 
which they may leverage in the interests of the parties and the public.429 
Today, eviction is the standard legal remedy for rent arrears, but it 
need not be in all cases. Courts have often allowed evictions to proceed 
simply because the lease agreement says so. But that approach, perhaps 
followed in the name of judicial restraint, abrogates the common-law 
power courts have traditionally exercised when circumstances required it. 
Today, the circumstances do require it. Eviction has been transplanted 
from long-passed circumstances in which it made more sense and pressed 
onto disputes for which it is sometimes an ill-fitted solution. Courts are 
well-positioned to notice when eviction is indeed an ill-fitted solution, and 
it is time they do so. 
 
425 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 359(1) (Am. Law Inst. 1981) (“Specific 
performance or an injunction will not be ordered if damages would be adequate to 
protect the expectation interest of the injured party.”). 
426 See supra Part IV, Section A.1. 
427 See supra Part IV, Section A.1. 
428 See supra Part IV, Section A.1. 
429 See supra Part IV, Section A.1.  
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